The disliking and frustration of the majority Kufans from the oppressions of Bani Umayah

The common people of Kufa were infuriated by the oppression inflicted by the rulers of Bani Umayyah, beginning during the caliphate of Uthman. They repeatedly voiced their grievances to Uthman, but their pleas were ignored due to his apathetic stance. One example of his unjust governance was the removal of Sa‘d ibn Abi Waqqas, a respected companion of the Prophet (s) from the governorship of Kufa, and the appointment of his Umayyad half-brother, Walid ibn ‘Uqbah, in his place. Walid was a known transgressor whose alcoholism was so severe that he once led the Fajr prayer with four rak‘at while intoxicated.

This marked the beginning of systematic Umayyad oppression in Kufa, which only intensified under Mu‘awiyah. He unleashed a campaign of brutality against the Shīʿa of Kufa through his illegitimate brother Ziyād ibn Sumayya, who carried out mass executions, torture, and terror. Though this reign of terror temporarily silenced the Kufans, it did not extinguish the burning resentment they held toward the Bani Umayyah.

When Muʿawiyah appointed his debauched son Yazīd as his successor—thereby transforming the caliphate into hereditary kingship—the Kufans believed that the final boundary of tolerance had been crossed. For them, enough was enough.

Who Were the Ones Who Wrote to Imām al-Ḥusayn (as)?

When Imām al-Ḥusayn (as) arrived in Makkah, he began receiving letters from Kūfah. These were sent by individuals disillusioned with the Umayyad regime, both the rule of Muʿāwiyah and the appointment of Yazīd. They called upon the Imam to come and lead them, declaring their rejection of Yazīd’s authority.

In response, the Imam did not proceed immediately. Instead, he sent his cousin and loyal companion, Muslim ibn ʿAqīl, to assess the political and religious atmosphere in Kūfah. This move raises a critical question: if Kūfah was truly a city of committed Shīʿah who believed in the divinely ordained Imamate of ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib (as), why did the Imam feel the need to verify their claims?

Clearly, Imām al-Ḥusayn (as) did not act on blind optimism. His decision to dispatch Muslim ibn ʿAqīl reflects the gravity of the situation and a deep awareness of the region’s volatility. Eventually, when the political situation in Makkah became perilous, he departed on the 8th of Dhū al-Ḥijjah toward Kūfah.

The Turning Point: The Appointment of Ibn Ziyād

Muslim ibn ʿAqīl arrived in Kūfah and initially found substantial support. Thousands pledged allegiance. At the time, Nuʿmān ibn Bashīr was the governor, but he was too passive to act against Muslim. Yazīd, upon learning of Muslim’s rising popularity, removed Nuʿmān and appointed the brutal ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Ziyād.

This decision was made on the advice of Sarjūn, a Christian court official who had served under both Muʿāwiyah and Yazīd. In Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, we read:

دعا سرجون مولاه وكان يستشيره، فأخبره الخبر، فقال له: أكنت فاعلًا ما كان أبوك يفعل؟ قال: نعم، قال: فابعث عبيد الله بن زياد إلى الكوفة، فإنه لا يصلحها غيره

“He summoned a Mawla of his called Sarjūn who used to advise him and gave him the news. Sarjūn asked whether he would accept  three advice of Muʿāwiyah if he were alive. When he agreed, Sarjūn said, “Then accept it from me. The only man for al- Kūfah is ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Ziyād over Kūfah. Give him authority over the city.'”
(Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, vol. 19, p. 18)

Though Yazīd had previously been angry with ʿUbayd Allāh and intended to remove him from Baṣrah, he now handed him command over both Baṣrah and Kūfah, instructing him:

“Hunt for Muslim ibn ʿAqīl and kill him if he found him.”
(ibid.)

This exposes the deliberate and premeditated nature of the Umayyad crackdown. The martyrdom of Imām al-Ḥusayn (as) was not a spontaneous outcome of military tensions, but a calculated plan rooted in Yazīd’s political agenda.

Did the Shīʿah who wrote letters to Imām al-Ḥusayn (as)  betray him?

A malicious claim, often propagated by nawāṣib and echoed by certain Sunni polemicists,is that the Shīʿah invited Imām al-Ḥusayn (as) to Kūfah only to later abandon and kill him.

This allegation has been used to shift blame away from the Umayyad regime and its agents. Among its most vocal promoters is Ihsān Ilāhī Ẓahīr, who peddles this distortion in his book al-Shīʿa wa Ahl al-Bayt (pp. 280–282). But this narrative collapses when the historical evidence is honestly examined. We shall submit seven pieces of evidence to debunk such a claim.

Evidence One: The First Letter from the minority Loyal Shīʿah of Ahl’ul bayt (as)

In the immediate aftermath of Mu‘awiyah’s death, the minority Shīʿa of the Ahl al-Bayt (as) in Kufa saw a fleeting opportunity in the midst of political upheaval. Having long believed that Imamate was the divine right of the Prophet’s (s) household, they had endured years of violent repression. But now, with the ascension of Yazīd, a figure whose open immorality and dynastic claim to power represented the culmination of Umayyad deviation, they perceived a moral and historical turning point.

Upon hearing that Imām al-Ḥusayn (as) had rejected giving his bayʿah to Yazīd and migrated from Madinah to Makkah, their hopes were ignited. The brutal silence imposed by Ziyād ibn Sumayya’s reign of terror was now untenable; inaction would be complicity. Moved by both conscience and conviction, a group of prominent Shīʿa gathered in the house of Sulaymān ibn Ṣurad al-Khuzāʿī, an elderly companion of the Prophet (s) and a veteran of Imam ʿAlī’s (as) battles, to organise resistance.

When the minority Shia learned that Imam Husayn (as) had refused to give bayya to Yazid and had migrated to Makkah from Madina, the people who had hitherto faced oppression saw Imam Hussain (as) as a light at the end of the tunnel and their conscience was telling them that this was the turning point, silence at that time would mean suicide. Hence the people gathered at the house of Suleman bin Surd, an elderly companion of Prophet (s) who had also participated in war alongside Ali bin Abi Talib (as), who said to the people:

“the death of Mu’awiyah, and praised and glorified God for that. Sulayman b. Şurad announced to us, “Mu’awiyah is dead. Al-Husayn has withheld giving his oath of allegiance to the Umayyads and has gone to Mecca. You are his Shiah and the Shiah of his father. If you know that you will be his helpers and fighters against his enemy, then write to him and tell him. But if you fear failure and weakness, do not tempt the man to risk his own life.”

(Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, vol. 19, p. 24)

These words of Sulaymān ibn Ṣurad demonstrate that he did not want to achieve his goals by creating temporary enthusiasm, rather he wanted people to recognise the harsh realties that would be linked to this decision. This is a natural phenomenon that whilst running high in sentiments, one fails to truly assess his actual strength and in consequence makes a major error. The people were encouraged by his words evidenced their willingness to fight the enemies of Imām al-Ḥusayn (as).

The question which arises here is: how many of these loyal Shia were there?

One can estimate the figure through the fact that the people had not gathered in an open field or a lavish palace but in the home of Sulaymān ibn Ṣurad, a traditional Arab house that was small in size, a size similar to that found today. The above cited conversation between Sulaymān ibn Ṣurad and the people of Kufa shows that they were made aware of the consequences that were inevitable for siding with the blessed Imam (as) ?  What followed was the earliest surviving letter addressed to Imām al-Ḥusayn (as), signed by leading Shīʿa figures who would later sacrifice their lives at Karbalāʾ:

“In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate, to al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī, from Sulaymān b. Ṣurad, al-Musayyab b. Najabah, Rifaʿah b. Shaddād, Ḥabīb b. Muẓāhir, and his Shīʿa of the believers and Muslims among the Kufans. Peace be with you.
We commend the praise of God, other than Whom there is no deity, to you. Praise be to God Who has broken your enemy, the obstinate tyrant who had leapt upon his community, stripped it of its authority, plundered its fayʾ and seized control of it without its consent. Then he killed the choice members of it and preserved the wicked members of this place. He made God’s wealth something that circulates only among the community’s tyrants and the wealthy. He was destroyed as Thamūd was destroyed.
There is no Imām over us. Therefore come, so God may unite us in the truth through you. Al-Nuʿmān b. Bashīr is in the governor’s palace, but we do not gather with him for the Friday prayer, nor do we accompany him out of the mosque for the Eid prayer. If we hear that you will agree to come to us, we will drive him away until we pursue him to Syria, if God wills. The peace and mercy of God be with you.”
(Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, vol. 19, pp. 24-25)

This letter is a bold and unambiguous declaration of allegiance to Imām al-Ḥusayn (as) as Imām al-Ḥaqq. It goes beyond personal loyalty—it is a profound theological and political statement. It denounces Yazīd’s regime as tyrannical and illegitimate, invoking the Qur’anic destruction of Thamūd to foreshadow the divine wrath they believed awaited the Umayyads. The letter vows active resistance, expressing not only rejection of Yazīd but a readiness to expel his governor by force and unite under Ḥusayn’s leadership.

Evidence Two: The Letter of the Opportunists

As discussed above, it was the Shīʿa al-Khāṣṣa—the devout and ideologically committed followers of the Ahl al-Bayt (s) who initiated the call to Imām al-Ḥusayn (as). Their letters were saturated with theological clarity, citing the injustice of Muʿāwiyah and Yazīd, affirming Ḥusayn’s divinely-ordained right to Imamate, and pledging active resistance. Their tone was moral, their stance principled, and their allegiance sealed through eventual martyrdom.

But their campaign awakened not only the righteous, it also stirred the opportunists.

Among the general population (ʿāmma) of Kūfa were individuals who had no commitment to Ḥusayn’s cause or the principles of Imamate. These were men addicted to the politics of self-preservation, always aligning themselves with the prevailing wind. When they saw the tide seemingly turning in Ḥusayn’s favor, they quickly feigned loyalty and wrote to him—not out of belief, but to gain worldly advantage. Their true motives are laid bare in the second letter they sent, a document stripped of any theological or ethical content, oozing with vague flattery and material seduction:

أما بعد، فقد اخضرّ الجناب، وأينعت الثمار، فإذا شئت فاقْدِمْ على جند لك مجند

“The janab (garden) has grown green, the fruits have ripened, and the waters have overflowed. Therefore if you want to, come to an army that has been gathered for you.”

(Ṭabarī, vol. 19, page 26)

‏

This shallow letter was signed by seven men: Shabath ibn Ribʿī, Ḥajjār ibn Abjar, Yazīd ibn Ḥārith, Yazīd ibn Ruwaym, ʿAzrah ibn Qays, ʿAmr ibn al-Ḥajjāj al-Zubaydī, and Muḥammad ibn ʿUmarī al-Tamīmī names that would soon be infamously etched into history for their betrayal at Karbalāʾ.

Unlike the sincere letters that spoke of Imamate, divine justice, and the corruption of the Umayyads, this opportunistic message contains no reference to the legitimacy of Ḥusayn (as), no denunciation of Yazīd, and no moral or theological plea. It is entirely transactional, an invitation clothed in flowery metaphors, devoid of principle and conviction. It was as if they were courting a worldly leader, not pledging themselves to the grandson of the Prophet (ṣ) and the bearer of divine authority.

These men were not concerned with truth, they were concerned with being on the winning side. Their affiliation to the Imam (as) was not linked to religious conviction, they were Shi’a of ‘Ali (as) because the such political positioning was gaining traction as the popular movement at that time.  Their language betrays their intent: it is not the voice of revolution, but of convenience. And when the tide turned and the Umayyad governor’s grip tightened, they immediately shifted their allegiance, now taking up arms against the very man they once invited.

The duplicity of this group did not end with ink and paper, it manifested fully on the battlefield of Karbalāʾ. Take Shabath ibn Ribʿī: not only did he betray Imām al-Ḥusayn (as), he emerged as one of the commanders in ʿUmar ibn Saʿd’s army. He had once postured as a Shīʿī, yet in reality, he was a staunch partisan of the Shaykhayn, and later, a narrator of ḥadīth in the Sunni tradition. His transformation from penning flowery support to wielding a sword against Ḥusayn (as) reveals a deeper truth: hypocrisy masked in religious language is a greater betrayal than open enmity.

Thus, this second letter stands as a document of opportunism—a stark contrast to the noble epistles of Sulaymān ibn Ṣurad and Ḥabīb ibn Muẓāhir.

Evidence Three: The Assembly of Muslim ibn ʿAqīl – Loyalty amidst hypocrisy

When Muslim ibn ʿAqīl (as), the trusted envoy of Imām al-Ḥusayn (as) arrived in Kūfah, the city buzzed with promises of allegiance. But Muslim (as) was not naïve; he knew that proclamations made in times of ease often evaporate when tested by fear. Therefore, he assembled those who had declared support—not merely to count heads, but to weigh hearts.

At this critical gathering, ʿĀbis ibn Abī Shaybīb al-Shākirī, a devout and fearless supporter stated:

“As for what follows: I will not speak on behalf of the people, for I do not know what is in their hearts, nor will I let their outward displays deceive you. But by Allah, I shall tell you of my own soul. By Allah, I will answer your call when you summon, fight your enemies by your side, and strike with my sword in your defence until I meet Allah. I seek nothing in this but His pleasure.”

(Ṭabarī, vol. 19, p. 29)

In this declaration, ʿĀbis distinguishes himself from the crowd, refusing to be the voice of hollow multitudes, and instead testifying only to what he has personally resolved with God. His words reflect a deep understanding of the fickle political climate of Kūfah: an environment infected with opportunism, hesitation, and betrayal.

He does not boast of numbers, nor place trust in superficial allegiance. Instead, his commitment is intimate, personal, and spiritual, rooted in sincerity and a longing for divine reward. It is a declaration that exposes the underlying fear and hypocrisy of many who surrounded Muslim, men whose pledges would soon dissolve under pressure, fear, and bribes from Ibn Ziyād.

Joining ʿĀbis in unwavering loyalty were Ḥabīb ibn Muẓāhir and Saʿīd ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥanafī, who likewise pledged not just political support, but sacrificial devotion to Imām al-Ḥusayn (as). Their actions matched their words, they later gave their lives at Karbalāʾ, becoming radiant beacons of istiqāmah (steadfastness) and ikhlāṣ (sincerity) in a sea of betrayal.

What makes this moment particularly striking is that even at this early stage—before swords had been drawn—the sincere among the Shīʿa sensed the danger lurking beneath Kūfa’s surface. They recognised that not all who spoke in the name of Ḥusayn (as) would remain loyal when tested. It is as if ʿĀbis’s statement was not only a vow of support, but a prophetic warning: that the path of Imām al-Ḥusayn (as) would soon be thinned, not by defeat in battle, but by the cowardice and betrayal of false friends.

Thus, the assembly convened by Muslim ibn ʿAqīl reveals more than enthusiastic support, it lays bare the moral landscape of Kūfa. Amidst thousands of pledges, only a handful were forged in sincerity. The rest were mirages, scattered by the heat of political intimidation and worldly temptation.

Evidence Four: The Imam’s own testimony at Qasr Banī Muqāṭil

Among the clearest refutations of the accusation that “the Shīʿa of Kūfa killed Imām al-Ḥusayn (as)” are the Imam’s own words, spoken at Qasr Banī Muqāṭil, a critical waypoint on his journey to Karbalāʾ. There, when Imām al-Ḥusayn (as) encountered ʿUbayd Allāh ibn al-Ḥurr al-Juʿfī, he explicitly described the basis upon which he had set out toward Kūfa and the unfolding betrayal that had taken place:

فإنهم قد كتبوا إليّ أنه ليس عليهم إمام، فقدمْ، لعل الله أن يجمعنا بك على الهدى. فقدمت، وأنا لا أدري، أصدقوا أم كذبوا. فقد قتل مسلم بن عقيل، وحبيب بن مظاهر، وسعد، وهانيء بن عروة، وقد أعانهم أهل الكوفة على ذلك، ثم أجمعوا على بيعة عبيد الله بن زياد ليزيد بن معاوية

“They wrote to me that they had no Imam and asked me to come so that God may unite them through me. But I do not know if they were truthful. Muslim ibn ʿAqīl, Ḥabīb ibn Muẓāhir, Saʿīd [ibn ʿAbd Allāh], and Hānī ibn ʿUrwah have been killed—with the help of the people of Kūfa. And now they have collectively pledged allegiance to ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Ziyād on behalf of Yazīd ibn Muʿāwiyah.”

‏

(Kalimāt al-Imām al-Ḥusayn, vol. 1, p. 366; al-Futūḥ, vol. 5, p. 72)

These words are not hearsay or partisan polemic, they are the direct, anguished observation of the Imām himself. He states plainly that:

• He responded to an invitation from a people who claimed to be without an Imām and who begged for his guidance.

• He questioned their sincerity—”I do not know if they were truthful or lying”—thus clearly identifying that not all who wrote were genuinely loyal.

• He confirms that the killings of his companions—Muslim, Ḥabīb, Hānī and others—were facilitated by the people of Kūfa.

• He clarifies that the city as a whole had now pledged allegiance to Ibn Ziyād and Yazīd, turning their backs on their promises and choosing tyranny over truth.

The claim that “the Shīʿa of Kūfa killed Imām al-Ḥusayn” collapses under the weight of this testimony. The people whom the Imam accuses here of complicity in murder and betrayal were not the true Shīʿa, but rather hypocrites, opportunists, and those whose allegiances shifted with the winds of power. Those who were true to their words, men like Muslim ibn ʿAqīl (as), Ḥabīb ibn Muẓāhir (ra), and Hānī ibn ʿUrwah(ra) were martyred before the battle of Karbalāʾ had even begun. And those who joined Ḥusayn (as) on the battlefield stood firm, giving their lives in loyalty.

This distinction is vital: the letters were many, but the sincere were few. The city of Kūfa was home to multiple factions, those who genuinely believed in the Imamate of Ḥusayn (as), those who sought worldly advantage, and those who actively aligned with Yazīd’s regime. The treacherous betrayal of Kūfa must be attributed to those who abandoned their pledge, not to the devoted Shīʿa who died honouring it.

Imām al-Ḥusayn’s own words confirm that the true Shīʿa did not kill him, they were killed for him. His lament is not aimed at loyal followers, but at the betrayal of the city that failed to uphold its promise.

Evidence Five: Nāfiʿ ibn Hilāl and Shīʿexposé of the Kūfan elites

As Imām al-Ḥusayn (as) advanced toward Kūfa, reports began to reach him from those who had managed to escape the shifting political tides of the city. Among them was Nāfiʿ ibn Hilāl al-Jamalī, a sincere and devout supporter of the Ahl al-Bayt (as), who joined the Imam’s camp. Upon arrival, Imām al-Ḥusayn asked him and his accolytes about the situation in Kūfa. Their response was unambiguous and damning:

‏”أما الأشراف فقد أعظمت رشوتهم، وملئت غرائرهم، ليستمال ودهم وتستنزل نصائحهم، فهم عليك إلها واحدا، وما كتبوا إليك إلا ليجعلوك سوقا لمكاسبهم.”

“The nobles have been bribed extensively, and their coffers filled to secure their loyalty. They only wrote to you to turn you into a means of worldly gain.”

(Ṭabarī, vol. 19, p. 98)

This testimony highlights the sharp divergence between the power-seeking elite of Kūfa and the sincere supporters of the Imam. What is described here is not a theological movement or religious uprising, but a market of corruption, where letters were weapons, loyalty was for sale, and the name of Ḥusayn (as) was invoked merely to serve personal and political ambition.

Several key points emerge from this statement:

• Bribery was institutionalised—the Umayyad regime, through ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Ziyād, secured the support of tribal leaders by filling their treasuries and corrupting their judgment.

• The letters to Imām al-Ḥusayn were not sincere cries for help or justice, rather they were political tools to lure him into becoming a pawn in their internal power struggles.

• Even these “signatories” had no commitment to the cause, as soon as power shifted, so did their loyalties.

This statement reveals that the letters sent to the Imam were polluted by hypocrisy, and many of the writers never had any intention of following through and were regiously affiliated Shia of Ali (as). They calculated that aligning with Ḥusayn (as) might bring them gain, but when the tides changed, they abandoned him for Yazīd.

Thus, when Sunnī polemicists claim that “the Shīʿa of Kūfa killed the Imam,” they are either deliberately misrepresenting the record or confusing tribal opportunists and bribed nobles with the loyal Shīʿa who stood beside Ḥusayn (as) and died defending him.

The true Shīʿa of Kūfa, like Nāfiʿ ibn Hilāl, exposed the deception early. And they sealed their sincerity with their blood at Karbalāʾ.

Evidence Six: Imām al-Ḥusayn’s declaration on the Night of ʿĀshūrāʾ

On the night before his martyrdom, Imām al-Ḥusayn (as) addressed his companions and made a devastating revelation. He released them from their oath of allegiance, giving them the opportunity to leave, and said:

“These people seek me and have found me. Their letters to you were but a trick, a deception to gain Yazīd’s favor.”

‏”إن القوم يطلبونني وقد وجدوني، وما كتبوا إليكم إلا مكيدة ومكرا، أرادوا أن يتقربوا بها إلى يزيد بن معاوية”

(Anṣāb al-Ashrāf, vol. 3, p. 185)

This confession, coming directly from the Imām himself, shatters the false notion that the writers of the letters were sincere Shīʿa. According to the Imām, the correspondence was a calculated deception, a trap laid not by loyalists but by political opportunists hoping to earn Yazīd’s approval by betraying the very man they had invited.

Evidence Seven: Shimr’s confession after Karbalāʾ

Even the Umayyad henchmen who executed the crime at Karbalāʾ later admitted that they acted not on principle, but out of servile obedience to tyrants. After the battle, Shimr ibn Dhī al-Jawshan (la) the butcher who beheaded the grandson of the Prophet (s), was seen praying. When confronted by Isḥāq ibn Sabīʿī, who asked:

‏”بأي وجه تلقى الله وقد قتلت ابن بنت نبيّه؟!”

“How can you face God after killing the grandson of His Prophet?”

Shimr replied with chilling honesty:

‏”هذا أمر أمرنا به أمراؤنا، ولو خالفناهم لكنا شرًّا من الحمير التي تغسل عنها المياه.”

“This was a command from our rulers. Had we disobeyed them, we would have been worse than the donkeys that carry water.”

(Tārīkh Madīnat Dimashq, vol. 23, p. 189; Mīzān al-Iʿtidāl, vol. 2, p. 280; Lisān al-Mīzān, vol. 3, pp. 152–153)

This statement exposes the true identity of Ḥusayn’s killers: men enslaved by the will of tyrants, motivated by cowardice, conformity, and careerism, not men of principle or spiritual allegiance. Shimr admits that obedience to Yazīd’s regime took precedence over morality, Prophetic bloodlines, and even God.

Conclusion:

The oft-repeated claim that the Shīʿa of Kūfa killed Imām al-Ḥusayn (aa) is a gross distortion of historical reality. It deliberately ignores the nuanced record of events and erases the sacrifices of those who stood beside the Imām in Karbalāʾ. The historical evidence supported by primary Sunni and Shīʿī sources, and even the words of the Imām himself makes one fact unequivocally clear: the true Shīʿa of Kūfa, the Shīʿat al-Khāṣṣa, were not the killers. They were the martyrs.

A consistent picture emerges across the evidence:

• Evidence One & Two show how many Kufans sincerely and courageously wrote to Imām al-Ḥusayn (as), declaring Yazīd’s regime illegitimate and pledging to die for their rightful Imām. Their letter, signed by 150 influential Kufan Shīʿa such as Sulaymān ibn Ṣurad and Ḥabīb ibn Muẓāhir, was a bold and unambiguous declaration of allegiance to Imām al-Ḥaqq and open resistance to Yazīd. This was not empty rhetoric—these men died at Karbalāʾ fulfilling that oath.

• Evidence Three demonstrates how early supporters like ʿĀbis ibn Abī Shaybīb, Ḥabīb ibn Muẓāhir, and Saʿīd ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥanafī were not deceived by Kūfan duplicity. They recognized the risk and still pledged to fight and die alongside Imām al-Ḥusayn (as)—and they did.

• Evidence Four reveals the Imām’s own assessment: while many wrote in his name, only the true Shīʿa of Kūfa, like Muslim ibn ʿAqīl and Hānīʾ ibn ʿUrwah, stood their ground and paid the price with their lives. The remainder of the populace either fell to fear or had never been genuine in their allegiance.

• Evidence Five presents Nāfiʿ ibn Hilāl and other companions warning the Imām that the noble class of Kūfa had sold themselves for bribes. They manipulated the letter campaign for political gain, not out of loyalty or love for Ahl al-Bayt.

• Evidence Six comes from the Imām himself on the night of ʿĀshūrāʾ: “They wrote to you only to deceive and trick you in order to earn Yazīd’s favor.” This confirms that the Kufan correspondence was infiltrated and corrupted by opportunists acting under political manipulation—not sincere Shīʿa conviction.

• Evidence Seven brings the words of Shimr, one of the killers: “We were ordered by our rulers. Had we disobeyed, we would have been worse than donkeys.” He confirms the killings were orchestrated by Umayyad authorities and enforced by terror—not religious allegiance.

As such, the Shīʿah al-Khāṣṣa of Kūfa who had written to the Imām did not betray him. They died for him. Among them:

• Ḥabīb ibn Muẓāhir (as), one of the signatories, was martyred at Karbalāʾ fighting for his Imām.

• Saʿīd ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥanafī, who delivered letters from Kūfa, shielded the Imām with his body during prayer and was pierced with countless arrows. (Ṭabarī, vol. 19, p. 144)

• ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn ʿAbd Allāh, who sought permission, entered the battlefield reciting poetry, and died fighting. (Absār al-ʿAyn, p. 78)

These were the real Shīʿa of Kūfa, loyal unto death. The betrayal came not from them, but from political opportunists like Shabath ibn Ribʿī, Ḥajjāj ibn al-Jabbār, Yazīd ibn Ḥārith, ʿAmr ibn al-Ḥajjāj, and Azrah ibn Qays. These were part of the ʿĀmma, the general masses who shifted allegiance when Ibn Ziyād’s sword loomed large. Their signatures on the letter were never driven by conviction but by the shifting tides of power.

The Disassociation of the Shīʿa al-Khāṣṣa from the murder of Imām al-Ḥusayn (as)

By the time Muslim ibn ʿAqīl (as) arrived, he found Kūfa aflame with anti-Umayyad sentiment. Both the Shīʿa al-Khāṣṣa (the committed and loyal partisans of the Ahl al-Bayt) and many from the ʿĀmma (the general populace) enthusiastically welcomed him and pledged allegiance on behalf of Imām al-Ḥusayn.

At that time, the Umayyad governor of Kūfa was Nuʿmān ibn Bashīr, a politically calculating figure who refrained from acting decisively against Muslim ibn ʿAqīl (as). His only public reaction was a sermon in which he half-heartedly warned against sedition and reminded people of their oath to Yazīd. This diplomatic restraint was not lost on the palace of Damascus. Al-Ṭabarī records Yazīd receiving a damning letter:

“Muslim ibn ʿAqīl has come to Kūfa, and the Shīʿa have given him the oath of allegiance on behalf of al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī. If you want Kūfa, send a strong man who will deal with him as you would an enemy. Al-Nuʿmān ibn Bashīr is weak, or at least behaving like a weak man.He was the first to write to him. Then ‘Umirah b. ‘Ugbah wrote to him. In a similar vein, as did ‘ʿUmar ibn Saʿd ibn Abī Waqqāṣ”
— Ṭabarī, vol. 19, p. 30

This is of course the ʿUmar ibn Saʿd, the very commander who would later lead the Umayyad army against Imām al-Ḥusayn (as) as per Tabrai:

Ṭabarī, vol. 19, p. 129

interestingly, Yazīd himself responded to this letter by describing those who wrote to him from Kūfa as “my Shīʿa”:

“My followers among the people of al-Kufah have written to me to inform me that In ‘Aqil is in al-Kufah gathering units in order to spread rebellion among the Muslims . Therefore, when you read this letter of mine, go to al-Kufah and search for Ibn ‘Aqil, as if you were looking for a bead, until you find him. Then bind him in chains, kill him, or expel him. Peace be with you.”
— Ṭabarī, vol. 19, p. 31

This is critical. Yazīd explicitly claims to have his own Shīʿa in Kūfa—those loyal to him and his regime. This further divides the landscape: on one side were the true Shīʿa of Ḥusayn, whose allegiance was grounded in love for the Ahl al-Bayt and resistance to injustice. On the other side were the Shīʿa of Yazīd—the opportunists, careerists, and tribal elites who aligned themselves with power, not with truth.

The Nasibi Accusation that Ibn Ziyad Was Shīʿa al-Khāṣṣa and Not a Shīʿa of Muʿāwiya

It is astonishing that some present-day Nawāṣib—in their desperate attempt to absolve their ideological ancestors—claim that ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Ziyād was from the Shīʿa al-Khāṣṣa (the close, devoted followers) of Imām al-Ḥusayn (as). This claim is not only historically baseless but an insult to the intelligence of any honest reader of Islamic history. Let us examine the matter objectively.

Firstly, Ibn Ziyād was no lover or follower of the Ahl al-Bayt (ʿalayhim al-salām). He was the son of Ziyād, the infamous bastard son of Sumayya, whom Muʿāwiya claimed as his brother and appointed as governor over Kūfa and Baṣra. This makes Ibn Ziyād both politically and ideologically a product of the Umayyad system. His loyalties lay squarely with the Banū Umayya.

Sunni hadith literature does not consider Ibn Ziyād a Shīʿī—let alone a member of the Shīʿa al-Khāṣṣa. In fact, he is listed as a narrator in Sunni hadith works, and no major Sunni authority has ever declared him a follower of Imām ʿAlī (ʿalayhi al-salām) or his progeny. On the contrary, his affiliations were with the rulers of his time—Muʿāwiya and then Yazīd—whom he served with brutal loyalty.

Yazīd himself praised Ibn Ziyād in the most glowing terms, clearly affirming their ideological unity. He said:

اسقني شربة تروي مشاشي … ثم مل فاسق مثلها ابن زياد
صاحب السر والأمانة عندي … ولتسديد مغنمي وجهادي

“O cup-bearer, give me a drink that quenches the thirst of my bones. Then pour one like it for Ibn Ziyād—
My confidant, my trustee, my aid in securing my spoils and waging my battles.”
(Murūj al-Dhahab, vol. 1, p. 377)

Would Yazīd call a member of Shīʿa al-Khāṣṣa his “confidant” and “trustee”? The praise clearly identifies Ibn Ziyād as one of his own—a loyal member of the Umayyad apparatus.

Moreover, the people of Kūfa were well aware of Ibn Ziyād’s wickedness and deviation from the path of the Prophet (ṣ). When Muslim ibn ʿAqīl was staying at the house of Hānī ibn ʿUrwa and news reached them that Ibn Ziyād was coming to meet Sharīk ibn al-Aʿwar, Sharīk advised Muslim to assassinate him. But when the opportunity passed, Sharīk questioned Muslim about why he let him go. Muslim replied:

“Two things. One of them was Hani’s dislike for him to be killed in his house. The other was a tradition that the people tell on theauthority of the Prophet. ‘Faith controls killing and a believer should not commit murder.” Hani’ said, ‘By God! If you had killed him, you would have killed a grave sinner (fasiq ), a profligate [fajirl, and an unbeliever (kafir[. Yet I disliked the idea of his being killed in my house.”
(Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, vol. , p. 41)

The words of Hānī ibn ʿUrwa are the words of a companion of Imām Ḥusayn (ʿa) and a respected elder of Kūfa—testifying to the open kufr and treachery of Ibn Ziyād. Is it possible that a Shīʿī al-Khāṣṣ could be described in such terms?

Finally, we must recall the political appointments that make the answer unambiguous:

• Ziyād ibn Abīh (his father) was appointed governor of Kūfa by Muʿāwiya.

• Yazīd, Muʿāwiya’s son, appointed Ibn Ziyād to the same post during his own reign.

• Ibn Ziyād carried out Yazīd’s orders in arresting, killing, and persecuting the Shīʿa al-Khāṣṣa—including Muslim ibn ʿAqīl, Hānī ibn ʿUrwa, and ultimately Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿa).

The Arrival of Ibn Ziyād and the Fear He Struck in the People of Kūfa

The entry of ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Ziyād into Kūfa marked the beginning of a reign of terror that revealed the true sentiments of the people towards him. Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī (vol. 19, pp. 33–34) describes the scene as follows:

“He left al-Basrah after he had made his brother ‘Uthman his Deputy, and he set off for al-Kufah. He took with him Muslim b.‘Amr al-Bihili and Sharik b. Al-A’war al-Hirithi, together with his entourage and his household. When he reached al-Kufah, he was wearing a black turban and he was veiled. News of Husayn’s departure had reached the people; they were expecting his arrival. When ‘ʿUbayd Allāh came, they thought that he was al-Husayn. ‘ʿUbayd Allāh could not pass a group of people without their greeting him. They said, ‘Welcome, son of the Apostle of God, your arrival is a happy event.” He saw in their joy at seeing al-Husayn something to trouble him. Muslim b . `Amr said, when they overdid it, “Retire, for this is the governor, `Ubaydallah b. Ziyad.” As he came in view, he checked his mount, and he only had some ten men with him”

The people’s warm greetings were clearly intended for Imām al-Ḥusayn (as), whom they were eagerly expecting. The moment they realised the man before them was not their awaited Imām but rather Yazīd’s notorious governor, fear spread rapidly. Their retreat and apprehension are telling: not a single person remained to show support for Ibn Ziyād. This mass withdrawal makes it unmistakably clear that the people of Kūfa never considered him a member of the Shīʿa al-Khāṣṣa. On the contrary, they recoghised him as a Nāṣibī—an enemy of the Ahl al-Bayt (ʿalayhim al-salām)—just like his cruel, illegitimate father, Ziyād ibn Abīh.

Ibn Ziyād’s arrival did not inspire reverence or love—it instilled dread. That alone refutes any absurd claim that he was ever counted among the devoted followers of Imām al-Ḥusayn (as).q

The Imposition of Surveillance and Martial Law in Kūfa

Upon entering Kūfa, Ibn Ziyād wasted no time transforming the city into a surveillance state. The Arab districts were overseen by ʿurafāʾ—local registrars tasked with administrative duties such as recording births, deaths, marriages, conducting censuses, and tracking known criminals. Ibn Ziyād weaponized this system of civil oversight to establish curfew-like conditions, effectively choking off all avenues of resistance and communication.

Ṭabarī records the governor’s brutal decree (Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, vol. 19 pages 34-35):

“Then he went down; he put the ‘arffs and the people to a severe test and said, “Write to me about the strangers, those among you who are sought by the Commander of the Faithful, those among you from Iaruriyyah, and the troublemakers whose concern is discord and turmoil . Whosoever of you makes these lists for uswill be safe from harm. But those of you who do not write anyone will have to guarantee that there is no opponent in his ‘irdfah who will oppose us, and no wrongdoer who will try to wrong us. Anyone who does not do so will be denied protection, and his blood and his property will be permitted to us. Any ‘arifin whose ‘irdfah is found anyone who is wanted by the Commander of the Faithful, whom he has not reported to us, will be crucified at the door of his house, and I will cancel that ‘irdfah from [the diwin of] payment, or he will be sent to a position in Uman (or) al-Zarrah.”

This decree marked a turning point in the psychological warfare Ibn Ziyād waged against the people of Kūfa. The imposition of a police state—backed by public executions, the threat of mass dispossession, and exile was designed not merely to root out political dissent but to paralyze the entire city with fear. Neighbours were incentivised to inform on one another; silence could mean death, while compliance meant complicity.

Under these draconian measures, any lingering hope the Kūfans had of rallying around Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿalayhi al-salām) was crushed under the weight of fear. The people may have admired the Imām privately, but Ibn Ziyād’s tyranny forced them into public submission. This explains why so many who once wrote passionate letters inviting the Imām to Kūfa now shrank into fearful inaction.

The Entrenched Presence of Muʿāwiya’s Military Apparatus in Kūfa

One crucial yet often overlooked reality when evaluating the political dynamics of Kūfa is the pre-existing presence of official military and security forces loyal to Muʿāwiya. These troops were not local; they were foreign forces dispatched from Shām (Syria) and embedded in Kūfa as part of a long-term strategy to maintain Umayyad control and suppress pro-Alid sentiment.

During Ziyād ibn Sumayya’s brutal governorship—imposed by Muʿāwiya—these Syrian troops were used to execute mass campaigns of intimidation, surveillance, and targeted assassinations against Kūfan dissenters. The city bore witness to years of bloodshed, with prominent Shīʿī figures and companions of Imām ʿAlī (ʿalayhi al-salām) being systematically hunted down. The scars of these purges were fresh in the memories of the people.

When Ibn Ziyād inherited this same infrastructure of repression from his father, he also inherited the loyalty of these battle-hardened Syrian forces. The Kufans were all too familiar with their brutality. Thus, when Ibn Ziyād issued threats, be it crucifixion, exile, or confiscation of property, these were not empty warnings. They carried the weight of precedent and the credibility of past atrocities.

The people of Kūfa, therefore, were not merely facing a new governor; they were contending with an entire apparatus of state terror that had already demonstrated its willingness to crush opposition. This explains why many who once invited Imām al-Ḥusayn (as) into their city fell silent or turned away in fear. The overwhelming presence of Muʿāwiya’s forces ensured that resistance was not simply dangerous—it was potentially suicidal.

The arrest and persecution of supporters of Muslim ibn ʿAqīl (as)

One of the key strategies employed by Ibn Ziyād to suffocate the Husayni uprising in Kūfa was the systematic arrest and imprisonment of those who supported Muslim ibn ʿAqīl (as). Ibn Ziyād tasked this operation to tribal loyalists under his control, notably Kathīr ibn Shihāb and Muḥammad ibn al-Ashʿath, both of whom were known agents of the Umayyad regime.

We read in Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī (vol. 19, p. 49):

“Kathīr met a man from Kalb named ʿAbd al-Aʿlā ibn Yazīd. He was carrying arms with the intention of joining Ibn ʿAqīl alongside his fellow youths. Kathīr seized him and brought him to Ibn Ziyād. When Ibn Ziyād interrogated him, the man claimed he was actually heading toward Ibn Ziyād. The governor sarcastically replied, ‘Sure, sure! I remember you promising me that!’ and ordered him to be imprisoned…Muḥammad ibn al-Ashʿath went out until he reached the houses of Banū ʿUmārah. There he encountered ʿUmārah ibn Salkhān al-Azdī, who was on his way to join Ibn ʿAqīl and was armed. Muḥammad seized him as well and sent him to Ibn Ziyād, who promptly imprisoned him.”

This repression campaign demonstrates that open support for Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿalayhi al-salām) or his envoy became a capital offense in Kūfa, punishable without trial. Those arrested were not from among the so-called “Shiʿa al-Khāṣṣa” (the intimate Shīʿa); they were ordinary believers and youths whose conscience led them to defend the family of the Prophet (ṣallallāhu ʿalayhi wa ālihi). And importantly, it was not the Shīʿa who arrested them—it was the regime and its collaborators.

Among these collaborators was Muḥammad ibn al-Ashʿath, a key figure in the Umayyad operation and a known adversary of Ahl al-Bayt (ʿalayhim al-salām). Far from being a Shīʿī, Muḥammad ibn al-Ashʿath is part of the early generation of narrators whose reports appear in the canonical ḥadīth collections of the Ahl al-Sunnah such as Sunan Abī Dāwūd hadith numbers 3511 (A tradition graded ṣaḥīḥ by the Salafī authority Nāṣiruddīn al-Albānī)

In Tahdhīb al-Kamāl (vol. 24, p. 496), Imām Ibn Ḥibbān listed him in al-Thiqāt (The Trustworthy), while Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī included him in Taqrīb al-Tahdhīb (vol. 2, p. 57, biographical entry 5760), classifying him among the tābiʿīn and assigning him the status of maqbūl (acceptable).

Despite his credentials within Sunni ḥadīth science, this man was an open Nasibī, an enemy of Ahl al-Bayt (as), who actively persecuted their supporters. He ultimately met his end at the hands of al-Mukhtār al-Thaqafī, the avenger of Karbalāʾ, as recorded in Tahdhīb al-Kamāl (vol. 24, p. 496):

قتله المختار سنة ست وستين

“Al-Mukhtār killed him in the year 66 [AH].”

Notably, Muḥammad ibn al-Ashʿath was the maternal nephew of Abū Bakr, the first caliph, as stated in Tahdhīb al-Kamāl (vol. 24, p. 495):

“Muḥammad ibn al-Ashʿath ibn Qays al-Kindī Abū al-Qāsim al-Kūfī—his mother was Umm Farwah bint Abī Quḥāfah, the sister of Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq.”

This family tie to the early caliphate may have protected his status and elevated his narrations in Sunni collections, but it does not absolve his role as a persecutor of Ahl al-Bayt’s partisans. His participation in the arrest of those aiding Muslim ibn ʿAqīl (ʿalayhi al-salām) underscores once more that the betrayers and oppressors in Kūfa were not the Shīʿa al-Khāṣṣa, but the collaborators and loyalists of the Umayyad regime—many of whom today are revered within Sunni ḥadīth traditions.

The rumour of Syrian reinforcements and the psychological collapse of Kufan Support

Another strategy employed by Ibn Ziyad to break the resolve of Kufans was psychological warfare: he deliberately spread rumors throughout the city that a powerful Syrian army was en route to Kufa. This planted a deep sense of fear and dread in the hearts of the populace. The mere mention of Syrian troops, renowned for their ruthlessness under Mu’awiya’s regime, caused panic and disarray among the supporters of Muslim b. Aqil.

Al-Ṭabarī records:

“Women began to come to their sons and brothers, urging them to go away as the people would be enough without them. Every man went to his son or his brother telling him, ‘Tomorrow the Syrians will come against you. What have you to do with the war and this evil doing? Go away.’ Thus, each took someone away. They continued to disperse so that by the time evening came Muslim b Aqil only had thirty men with him in the mosque.”
History of Ṭabarī, Vol. 19, pp. 51

At this point, fear had reached a fever pitch. The entire atmosphere in Kufa had transformed: the city was gripped by silence, with homes shuttered, streets emptied, and individuals too frightened to even inquire about their own relatives and neighbours. What had begun as a hopeful uprising in support of the grandson of the Prophet (s) had rapidly devolved into a citywide retreat, driven by a climate of terror. Ibn Ziyad’s calculated tactic had succeeded in isolating Muslim b. Aqil, without the need for combat by dismantling his support base through fear.

The dire situation of the Shia al-Khassa under Ibn Ziyad’s oppression

The small group of devoted Shia al-Khassa who remained in Kufa found themselves under relentless pressure and persecution. Though many sought refuge within the city, Ibn Ziyad was relentless in rooting out any potential supporters of Husayn ibn Ali (as). He was acutely aware that Husayn’s imminent arrival in Kufa could revive the battered spirits and resolve of the populace, reigniting resistance against Umayyad authority. To preempt this, Ibn Ziyad initiated a systematic crackdown, identifying and arresting all individuals perceived as threats to the regime—including notable figures such as Mukhtar ibn Abi Ubaidah al-Thaqafi and Abdullah ibn Harthi ibn Nofal.

Following the martyrdom of Muslim ibn Aqil (as), Yazid himself ordered Ibn Ziyad with strict instructions:

“I have been informed that al-Husayn b. Ali has set out for Iraq. Therefore set lookouts and watches, and be vigilant against suspicious characters. Arrest anyone on suspicion but only kill those who fight against you.”
History of Ṭabarī, Vol. 19, p. 64

This directive catalysed a swift and sweeping campaign of arrests and imprisonments. Ibn Ziyad later reflected on the thoroughness of this crackdown after Yazid’s death:

“There was no individual about whom there were suspicions that he might oppose the government who was not imprisoned.”
Tarikh Ṭabarī, Vol. 7, p. 18

The depth of his ruthlessness was further revealed during his flight from Kufa to Syria, when he lamented to Sayf:

“I was just saying to myself that I wish I had issued an order that the prisoners be brought out and beheaded.”
Tarikh Ṭabarī, Vol. 7, p. 70

This regret reflected the danger posed by these imprisoned opponents—figures such as Mukhtar—who later led revolts that seriously challenged Umayyad rule.

Through these oppressive tactics of surveillance, imprisonment, and terror, Ibn Ziyad effectively dismantled opposition and cemented Umayyad control over Kufa. He did not stop there; similar harsh measures were imposed on neighbouring cities with significant Shia populations, such as Basrah and al-Madain, as he extended his campaign to suppress any remaining pockets of resistance.

Strategic barricading of Kufa and its surroundings to prevent the arrival of Shia reinforcements

Following the instructions of Yazīd, Ibn Ziyād imposed strict surveillance across the main exits of various cities, erecting barricades and deploying troops to prevent Shīʿī reinforcements from entering Kūfah. Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī informs us:

“Ibn Ziyād sent al-Ḥusayn b. Tamīm, the commander of the police, to station himself at al-Qādisiyyah and to set the cavalry between the area of al-Qādisiyyah to Khaffān, and the area of al-Qādisiyyah to al-Quṭquṭānah and to Laʿlā.”
(Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Volume 19, page 83)

Professor Howard, in a footnote on the same page, explains:

“Laʿlā was a halting place between al-Kūfah and al-Baṣrah.”

This demonstrates that strategic military posts were installed in such a way that access into Kūfah had effectively been blocked. The movement in and out of the city was now under complete military control.

On the very next page, we learn that Qays b. Mushir, who was carrying a letter from Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿalayhi al-salām) to the people of Kūfah, was arrested at al-Qādisiyyah by al-Ḥusayn b. Tamīm. He was then taken to Ibn Ziyād, who had him executed.

(Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Volume 19, page 84)

When Imām al-Ḥusayn (as) himself arrived near these locations, he asked local desert dwellers about the situation. They responded:

“By Allāh, we don’t know anything except the fact that neither we can exit nor can we enter.”

This statement reveals the extent of the lockdown: the local population itself was unaware of external developments and was cut off from basic travel.

Later, when Ḥurr b. Yazīd al-Riyāḥī and his troops intercepted Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿalayhi al-salām) and his supporters near al-Qādisiyyah, he said:

“These men from al-Kūfah are not among the party that came with you. I will either detain them or send them back.”

To this, Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿalayhi al-salām) replied:

“I will defend them in the same way I would defend my own life. They are only my supporters and helpers… they are my followers, and they are just like those who came with me.”
(Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Volume 19, page 98)

By the time Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿalayhi al-salām) had reached Karbalāʾ, recruitment of troops from al-Nukhaylah to fight against him had already begun.

(Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, Volume 19, page 129)

In conclusion, the military barricades around Kūfah and the deployment of forces at key junctions were not random or precautionary; they were deliberate and calculated moves. Ibn Ziyād sought to isolate Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿalayhi al-salām) from his supporters in Kūfah and surrounding cities like al-Baṣrah and al-Madāʾin, where sizeable Shīʿī populations resided. This blockade served as a form of pre-emptive suppression, ensuring that the uprising of Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿalayhi al-salām) could not gather momentum through local support.

The Arrest of Kūfans Who Refused to Fight Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī (as)

The grim reality is that the Shīʿa al-Khāṣṣah of Kūfah—those known for their unwavering loyalty to Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿalayhi al-salām)—were either murdered or imprisoned before they could reach him. Meanwhile, on the orders of Ibn Ziyād, the ʿĀmmah (general population) of Kūfah were being forcibly conscripted to join the military campaign against Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿalayhi al-salām) at Karbalāʾ. Many among this ʿĀmmah had no desire to fight the Imām, and when given the chance, they attempted to flee back to Kūfah.

To suppress this trend of desertion, Ibn Ziyād dispatched Suwayd b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Munqarī along with other agents to Kūfah to arrest anyone attempting to escape military duty. On one occasion, Suwayd mistakenly arrested a Syrian man who had merely come to Kūfah on personal business. Nevertheless, he was sent to Ibn Ziyād, who ordered his execution—using him as a public example to deter others from retreating. As a result, many reluctant recruits from Kūfah who had hoped to avoid the battlefield were forcibly returned to Karbalāʾ.

(Akhbār al-Ṭiwāl, p. 252)

These accounts establish several critical facts:

• The systematic purge of the Shīʿa al-Khāṣṣah of Kūfah—the known supporters and allies of Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿalayhi al-salām)—meant that those most willing and prepared to defend him were deliberately eliminated. Many were killed, while others were imprisoned, depriving the Imām of the very reinforcements he was expecting from Kūfah.

• The ʿĀmmah of Kūfah, though not committed Shīʿa, included many who harbored sympathy or moral hesitation about fighting the grandson of the Prophet (ṣallā Allāhu ʿalayhi wa-ālīhi). However, the highly organized surveillance and barricade system put in place around Kūfah made it virtually impossible for them to reach the Imām. Those who attempted to do so risked arrest at key military posts such as al-Nukhaylah (located between Kūfah and Karbalāʾ), Khaffān, or along the routes from al-Qādisiyyah to al-Quṭquṭānah or Laʿlā.

• Ibn Ziyād implemented a policy of forced conscription, requiring all Kūfans of fighting age to join the army mobilized against Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿalayhi al-salām). For many ordinary citizens, joining the army was not a matter of ideological alignment but of survival—an attempt to protect their families, their lives, and their material possessions under coercive pressure.

This campaign of suppression ensured that Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿalayhi al-salām) would stand virtually alone on the battlefield of Karbalāʾ, cut off from the very people who had once written to him in droves, inviting him to Kūfah and pledging their allegiance.

Duress Was Complemented by Efforts to ‘Convince’ the Shīʿa al-ʿĀmmah That Yazīd Was the Legitimate Head of State

Once Ibn Ziyād initiated his campaign of terror and suppression, his primary focus was no longer the Shīʿa al-Khāṣṣah—who had already been executed or imprisoned in Kūfah—but rather the Shīʿa al-ʿĀmmah, the general masses who still maintained some sympathy for Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿalayhi al-salām). This group, unlike the Khāṣṣah, did not adhere to the Imamate on the basis of divinely sanctioned religious belief. Their allegiance to the Ahl al-Bayt (ʿalayhim al-salām) was largely political and conditional—grounded in historical loyalty, personal preference, or social influence. Many among them had once supported Amīr al-Muʾminīn ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (ʿalayhi al-salām) after the death of ʿUthmān, but had done so primarily because he had attained the ijmāʿ (consensus) of the Muslim polity at the time.

Recognizing the pliability of this group, the Umayyad regime pursued a two-pronged strategy to bring them in line: first, through coercion—threats, arrests, and forced conscription into Yazīd’s army—and second, through propaganda intended to present Yazīd as the rightful head of state. Advocates of Yazīd, including notable ṣaḥābah like ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar (as we shall elaborate later), were instrumental in lending religious and political legitimacy to Yazīd’s rule in the eyes of the masses.

Through such efforts, many among the Shīʿa al-ʿĀmmah suppressed their personal doubts and emotional inclinations toward Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿalayhi al-salām), and accepted Yazīd’s khilāfah on the basis of perceived consensus across the Arab provinces. The earlier letters written to Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿalayhi al-salām) reflected a moment of hesitation, a lingering sympathy. But these were overridden by the combined force of state-sponsored intimidation and religious legitimization campaigns. Once they were convinced that Yazīd had received bayʿah (allegiance) from the major cities and had the backing of influential figures, they retracted any support for the Imām and embraced Yazīd’s claim to leadership—mistakenly believing it to be validated by ijmāʿ.

In essence, these Kūfans were only considered Shīʿa of ʿAlī (ʿalayhi al-salām) as long as he held power. Once Yazīd appeared to hold that power with widespread support, many among them had no theological or moral objection to shifting their allegiance.

The Support of Imām al-Ḥusayn (as) by the Shīʿa al-Khāṣṣa Despite Severe Hardships

Despite the immense challenges imposed by Ibn Ziyād’s brutal crackdown, historical records bear witness to the fact that members of the Shīʿa al-Khāṣṣa—those elite and devoted followers who had initiated the revolutionary correspondence with Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿalayhi as-salām)—remained loyal. Many of them reached Karbalāʾ and ultimately gave their lives in defense of the Imām.

Among those who pledged their support upon hearing Muslim ibn ʿAqīl (ʿalayhi as-salām) read Imām al-Ḥusayn’s letter were:
ʿĀbis ibn Abī Shabīb al-Shākirī, Saʿīd ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥanafī, and Ḥabīb ibn Muẓāhir al-Faqʿasī. According to Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī (vol. 19, p. 29), all three joined the Imām and were martyred defending him.

Muslim ibn ʿAqīl (ʿalayhi as-salām) also appointed Muslim ibn ʿAwsaja al-Asadī and Abū Thumāmah al-Ṣāʾidī to critical leadership roles during his mission in Kūfa (Ṭabarī, vol. 19, p. 98). Both men later fought alongside Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿalayhi as-salām) in Karbalāʾ and were martyred in his defense (Ṭabarī, vol. 19, pp. 137, 142).

Those who remained unwavering in their support until their bodies lay lifeless before Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿalayhi as-salām) include:

• Burayr ibn Khuḍayr al-Hamdānī: Professor Howard notes in Ṭabarī (vol. 19, p. 119) that “from his position among the followers of al-Ḥusayn, he seems to have been a leading member of the Kūfan Shīʿas. He died fighting for al-Ḥusayn.” A soldier of Ibn Saʿd confirmed that Burayr was known as a qārī (reciter of the Qurʾān), saying: “He often recited the Qurʾān to us in the mosque” (Ṭabarī, vol. 19, p. 133).

• Anas ibn al-Ḥārith al-Kāhilī, a companion of the Prophet (ṣallallāhu ʿalayhi wa ālihi), is listed by both Ibn al-Athīr in Asad al-Ghābah and Ibn Ḥajar in al-Iṣābah, who note he was a resident of Kūfa and traveled to Karbalāʾ to support the Imām.

• Nāfiʿ ibn Hilāl al-Jumalī al-Murādī (Ṭabarī, vol. 19, p. 145)

• Ḥanẓala ibn Asʿad al-Shibāmī (Ṭabarī, vol. 19, pp. 146–147)

• Mujammiʿ ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-ʿĀ’idī (Ṭabarī, vol. 19, p. 150)

• al-Murraqāʿ al-Asadī (Ṭabarī, vol. 19, pp. 162–163)

• Sayf ibn al-Ḥārith, Mālik ibn ʿAbd ibn Suray, ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUmayr al-Kalbī, al-Qāsim ibn Ḥabīb al-Azdī, Zuhayr ibn al-Qayn al-Bajalī, Yazīd ibn Ziyād al-Muṣāhir, and many others—including:

  • ʿĀʾidh ibn Majmaʿ, ʿUmar ibn Khālid al-Ṣaydāwī, Janāda ibn Ḥārith al-Salmānī, Muʿawwid ibn ʿAmr, Sawwār ibn Munʿim al-Hamdānī, ʿUmar Qarzah al-Anṣārī, Nasīm ibn ʿIjlān al-Anṣārī, ʿAbd Allāh ibn Bashar al-Khashʿamī, Sālim ibn ʿAmr al-Kalbī, Muslim ibn Kathīr al-Azdī, Ḥārith ibn ʿAmr al-Qays al-Kindī, Bashshār ibn ʿUmar al-Kindī, Dāfiʿ ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Azdī, Nuʿmān ibn ʿAmr, Masʿūd ibn Ḥajjāj al-Tamīmī, Juwain ibn Mālik al-Taymī, ʿUmar ibn Dhubayʿah al-Taymī, Ḥabbāb ibn ʿĀmir al-Taymī, Umayyah ibn Saʿd al-Ṭāʾī, Zarzam ibn Mālik al-Thaʿlabī, Kinān ibn ʿAtīq al-Thaʿlabī, Qāsiṭ ibn Zuhayr, Kardūs ibn Zuhayr al-Thaʿlabī, Jiblah ibn ʿAlī al-Shaybānī

It is astonishing that sectarian-minded Nawāṣib are quick to cite the remorse of the Tawwābūn, yet they willfully ignore the list of loyal Shīʿa al-Khāṣṣa who reached Karbalāʾ and gave their lives for Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿalayhi as-salām). Even more absurd is that while none of these men played any role in the Imām’s murder, many of the perpetrators of Karbalāʾ went on to become “reliable” narrators in Sunni ḥadīth literature.

As for those among the Shīʿa al-Khāṣṣa who, due to the suppression of Ibn Ziyād, were unable to reach Karbalāʾ, there is no evidence implicating them in the Imām’s killing. On the contrary, when Ibn Ziyād returned to Kūfa after the massacre, the sincere Shīʿa expressed immense remorse.

Imām Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī records:

” After al-Husayb b. Ali had been killed and Ibn Ziyad had returned from his army camp at al-Nukhaylah and entered al-Kufah, the Shi’ah gathered, full of self-reproach and repentance. They thought they had committed a grave offense in inviting al Husayn to receive their support then failing to respond to him, and in letting him be killed so near to them while they never gave him any help. They thought their ignominy and sin which had resulted from his slaying would only be washed away by killing those who killed him or by dying in the attempt”
(Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, vol. 20, p. 80)

This narrative obliterates the Nasibī lie that the Shīʿa al-Khāṣṣa were responsible for the martyrdom of Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿalayhi as-salām). Two critical facts emerge:

• They failed to aid Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿalayhi as-salām) due to circumstances beyond their control.

• They were filled with guilt and sought to atone by avenging the Imām’s blood.

At a gathering held in the home of Sulaymān ibn Ṣurad al-Khuzāʿī, Musayyib ibn Najbah addressed the mournful crowd:

“We were enamored of self-justification and praising our party until God put our best men to the test and found us sham on two of the battlefields of the son of our Prophet’s daughter. Before that, we had received his letters and his messengers had come to us offering forgiveness, asking us to help him again in public and in private. But we withheld ourselves from him until he was killed so near to us. We did not help him with our hands, argue on his behalf with our tongues, strengthen him with our wealth or seek help for him from our clans. What will be our excuse for our Lord and at the meeting with our Prophet when his descendant, his loved one, his offspring and his issue has been slain among us? No, by God, there is no excuse unless you kill his murderer and those who assisted him or unless you are killed while seeking that..”
(Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, vol 20, p. 81)

This speech shatters the Nasibī narrative once more and proves that those who were part of the Tawwābūn movement were not among the killers, but rather among those who grieved their failure and sought redemption.

Sulaymān was eventually chosen as the leader of the Tawwābūn, and his sermon, delivered every Friday, declared:

“What good is it for the most virtuous of this Party that we were yearning for the family of our Prophet to come, offering them help and urging them to come, but when they came we were weak and feeble and spineless, we delayed and waited to see what would happen, until the descendant of our Prophet, his offspring and his progeny, flesh of his flesh and blood of his blood, was killed in our very midst ? He called for help but received none, he asked for justice but was not given any. The impious ones made him a target for arrows and a butt for spears until they had broken him, assaulted him and stripped him.”
(Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, vol. 20, p. 83)

This underscores the undeniable truth: the killers of Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿalayhi as-salām) were not the Shīʿa al-Khāṣṣa. They were Fāsiqīn—many of whom later appeared in Sunni isnād chains as “ʿudūl” (trustworthy) narrators. The Shīʿa al-Khāṣṣa, on the other hand, remain examples of devotion, sacrifice, and loyalty till death.

The Shaykh and Notables of the ʿĀmma Were Responsible for the Murder of Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿa), Not the Shīʿa

After the death of Yazīd, a group of Shīʿa approached Sulaymān b. Ṣurad and suggested that the time was ripe to rise and avenge the martyrdom of Imām al-Ḥusayn (as), given the political instability. Sulaymān responded with a powerful sermon:

“I have reflected on what you say, and my opinion is that the murderers of al-Husayn are the notables of the people of al-Kufah and the champions of the Arabs. It is they from whom vengeance for his blood is to be sought. But if they knew what you want and that they are the ones sought after, they would come down heavily on you. And I have thought about those of you who have followed me and I know that if they revolted, they would not obtain their vengeance , not obtain satisfaction for themselves, and not injure their enemy but be merely a slaughter for them. Rather, send your propagandists into the garrison town and summon this party of yours, and others not of it, to your affair”.
(Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, vol. 20, p. 90)

This sermon makes two critical points. First, it confirms that those responsible for the murder of Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿa) were the tribal elites of the ʿĀmma of Kūfa — not the Shīʿa. Second, it exposes the harsh truth about the few remaining Shīʿa al-Khāṣṣa in Kūfa: they were so few in number that they could be easily eliminated, and many had been, prior to ʿĀshūrāʾ.

ʿUbaydullāh b. ʿAbdillāh declared:

“Have you not seen and have you not heard what evil was done to the son of your Prophet’s daughter? Did you not regard how the people violated his sanctity, considered as weakness his solitariness, splattered him with blood, and pulled him down to the ground? In it they did not respect their Lord or al-Husayn’s kinship with the Prophet. They made him a target for arrows and left him a slaughter for the hyenas. Blessed are the eyes of him who has seen the like of him, and blessed is Husayn the son of -Ali. What a man was he they betrayed! He was true and patient, trustworthy, helpful and resolute; he was the son of the first of the Muslims in Islam and the son of the daughter of the Messenger of the Lord of the Worlds. His defenders were few while his foes flocked around him, and his enemy killed him while his friend betrayed him. Woe to the killer and shame on the traitor! God will accept no plea from his killer and no excuse from his betrayer unless he sincerely turns to God in repentance , struggles against the murderers, and opposes the unrighteous”. (Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, vol. 20, p. 91)

When the forces who had come to avenge Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿa) reached Karbalāʾ, Mathnā b. Makhbariyyah addressed the people with these words:

“God made these men, whose status you have mentioned relative to their Prophet, superior to anyone except their Prophet. A mob to whom we are enemies and with whom we recognize no ties killed them. We have left our homes, our people and our properties seeking the extirpation of those who killed them . (Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, vol. 20, p. 133-134)

These statements together present a unified historical picture: the army that martyred Imām al-Ḥusayn (ʿa) consisted of tribal leaders and their followers from among the ʿĀmma of Kūfa. Not a single individual from the Shīʿa al-Khāṣṣa — the loyal, elite partisans of the Ahl al-Bayt (ʿa) — was present in that army. On the contrary, the Khāṣṣa were either martyred, imprisoned, or suppressed prior to Karbalāʾ, and the majority of the ʿĀmma were manipulated or coerced by the state machinery into complicity with Yazīd’s regime.

.