Carrying on from the previous chapter, we will in this chapter offer our submissions, for the consideration of our readers based on the texts cited therein. We have thereafter cited the defences of Ibn al Hashimi to each submission followed by our replies to each defence of Ibn al-Hashimi. Thus, the chapter is actually split in to Submission – Defence – Reply.
We quoted the speech of Umar, it should be remembered that Abu Bakr had heard of the Prophet (saaws)s death, the news had been sent out to the neighboring areas. Umar was in Madinah, so there was no doubt that he knew that the Prophet (saaws) was dead. Despite this al Tabari informs us that Umar was threatening to kill anyone who conveyed the Prophet (saaws)’s demise to anyone. Why, knowing that the Prophet (saaws) was dead was Umar seeking to deny the truth, to the extent that he even vowed in God’s name that he (saaws) was alive? Why was he reporting to threats of amputation if the truth was made known?
His chief advocate offers a risible medical diagnosis so as to exonerate his client Ibn al Hashimi argues:
We have already addressed this point in our article: Umar (رضّى الله عنه) was very emotional over the loss of the Prophet (صلّى الله عليه وآله وسلّم) and he had entered the first stage of grief which is denial. The American Psychiatric Association (AMA) states in “Grief Counseling”:
The first stage of grief is denial of the loss…The thought of permanent loss is so painful that persons deny their loss in order to avoid facing the painful feelings. Denial of loss causes a flight from reality. Parkes et al. state that persons in denial may (thereby psychologically) minimize their loss…
Often the bereaved refuse to face the reality of the loss, and may go through a process of not believing, and pretending that the person is not really dead…This denial can take several forms: Denying the facts of the loss. The bereaved may manifest symptoms that range from slight reality distortions to full blown delusions. There may be attempts to keep the body in the house, retaining possessions ready for use when the deceased returns, or keeping the room of the deceased untouched for years…
The bereaved may invent stories, sometimes so complex as to be bizarre, to explain away the deceased’s absence…in spite of having seen the deceased’s body with one’s own eyes…[we would] intuitively assume that the bereaved would affirm the loss on seeing the deceased’s body or attending the funeral; however, this is not the case: the distortions of reality can sometimes become firmer with such “evidence.” This paradoxical effect is believed to be a result of the intensely emotional and traumatizing nature of such “evidence” (i.e. seeing the dead body) which causes the bereaved to have a flight from reality as a defense mechanism…
The bereaved may at first seem to accept the news of a loved one’s death, but later this may not be the case after having viewed the body (especially if the body is mangled, etc.) or attending the funeral…the more emotional and traumatic the experience, the higher the likelihood…of a flight from reality…
Such people will reject, often violently, any others who seek to affirm the loss that the patient has denied…Anger is a grief reaction commonly associated with denial, usually directed towards the harbinger of the news of the loss as well as those who seek to affirm the loss or those who reject the denial…these people require careful and appropriate grief counseling…
(Grief Counseling, American Psychiatric Association)
Our Shia brothers often bring up Umar’s denial as some sort of proof against him, but if anything, it serves as a strong proof that Umar (رضّى الله عنه) loved the Prophet (صلّى الله عليه وآله وسلّم) so deeply that he could not face this loss of his loved one. His denial was a psychological defense mechanism. The author of this article has himself went through his psychiatry rotation in medical school, and can say without any shadow of doubt that Umar (رضّى الله عنه) was displaying a textbook presentation of denial.
Those of us that have either personally experienced grief or witnessed others suffering from it will know that it is a lengthy torturous process, the scars are so deep they can take months and indeed sometimes years to heal. TheUSmilitary invested millions of dollars into treating their Vietnam War veterans that returned home suffering from post traumatic stress disorder. Even in this age of advanced prognosis and treatment, clinical psychiatrics have acknowledged that the road to full, normal recovery for those suffering from post traumatic stress disorder is a lengthy one. When it comes to the length of time allow us to cite an online article “Grief, bereavement and depression”
Written by Dr PJ Marshall, MB ChB MRCPysch and Clare Atkinson, research specialist registrar in psychiatry
“What is normal grief?
This is a term used to describe the typical symptoms somebody experiences after bereavement. It can include:
The initial disturbance the above symptoms causes is gradually reduced and people begin to accept the loss and readjust.
A grief reaction can last for up to 12 months, but can vary within different cultures. The average is probably around six months. A resurgence of symptoms can also occur briefly on anniversaries of the bereavement and on birthdays, etc of the deceased”.
Now Dr Ibn al Hashimi, if grief on average can last up to six months can Ibn al Hashimi kindly explain how Umar’s evaporated within a matter of hours? The fact that Umar was able to overcome that grief so quickly, in itself proves that he was not grieving at all, rather it was all a sham, a fact attested to by Numani that we shall cite later in this chapter.
We read in History of Tabari, English translation, Volume 9 p 184 that “The Messenger of God died while Umar was present and Abu Bakr was in al-Sunh”. As per the testimony of Numani, Sunh from where Abu Bakr received the tragic news was two miles from Madinah 2, Al Faruq, by Allamah Shibli Numani, translated by Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, Vol 1 p 83 now if the information had reached the neighbouring areas don’t you think that the residents of Madinah had heard the news first? Having such love for the Prophet (saaws) it is probable that the companions had already seen the Prophet (saaws)’s dead body with their own eyes? So what was Umar trying to suppress the news for? The fact is this was all a ruse; he was stalling time, awaiting for the arrival of Abu Bakr.
There was absolutely no doubt that the Holy Prophet (saaws) was dead as Haykal comments:
“The women, however, were still beating their faces and crying at Muhammad’s house, a sure sign that Muhammad had really died. Yet, here in the Mosque Umar was still proclaiming Muhammad had not died”
The life of Muhammad, by H. Haykal, p 505 (6th edition)
It is therefore right for us to ask, why did Umar opine that the Prophet (saaws) was super-human and could never die? This was a considerable departure from his attitude just days early when the Prophet (saaws) had asked for writing materials. On this occasion the same Umar had equated the Prophet (saaws)’s position to that of an ordinary man suffering from pain, to the extent that Umar felt that his request should be refused because he was not in the right frame of mind? Why the sudden change in attitude?
Ibn al Hashimi argues:
Why should Answering-Ansar ask this question unless they are ignorant of the historical record? Even a novice Islamic historian knows that Umar (رضّى الله عنه) himself explained the reason why he thought that the Prophet (صلّى الله عليه وآله وسلّم) had not died. Umar (رضّى الله عنه) said:
“Do you know, Ibn Abbas, what prompted me to speak as I did when the Messenger of Allah died? …By Allah, nothing prompted me (to utter those words) but that I used to read the following [Quranic] verse: ‘We have set you up as a moderate nation so that you may act as witness of mankind, as the Messenger is a witness for you.’ (Quran, 2:143) By Allah, I thought that the Messenger of Allah would remain among his people until he could witness for them to their last deeds. That was what prompted me to say what I said.”
(The History of al-Tabari, Vol.9, p.201)
So why would Answering-Ansar ask such an ignorant question such as “was Umar (رضّى الله عنه) under the view that the Prophet (صلّى الله عليه وآله وسلّم) was super-human and could never die?” Umar (رضّى الله عنه) himself clearly said that he did in fact think that the Prophet (صلّى الله عليه وآله وسلّم) could die but that he thought that he would be the last of them to die (i.e. after the death of all the Sahabah). This was based on the verse in the Quran in which Allah says that the Prophet (صلّى الله عليه وآله وسلّم) was acting as a witness over them (i.e. the Sahabah), and it was on this basis that Umar (رضّى الله عنه) reasoned that the Prophet (صلّى الله عليه وآله وسلّم) must literally witness the acts and deeds of the Sahabah until each and every one of them died.
Naturally, this sort of rationalization by Umar (رضّى الله عنه) may seem far-fetched, but having gone through my psychiatry rotation in medical school, the author must concur with the American Psychiatry Association:
The bereaved may invent stories, sometimes so complex as to be bizarre, to explain away the deceased’s absence…in spite of having seen the deceased’s body with one’s own eyes…
(Grief Counseling, American Psychiatry Association)
…
The sort of rationalization used by Umar (رضّى الله عنه) was an elobarate defense mechanism. If anything, this shows how strongly Umar (رضّى الله عنه) was affected by the Prophet’s death and it dispels the myth perpetrated by the Shia that these Sahabah did not love the Prophet (صلّى الله عليه وآله وسلّم).
So let us get this straight the same Umar who insisted that the Prophet (s) should be denied writing materials as the Quran was sufficient for us, was ignorant of those verses that make it clear that the Prophet could die! If as Umar had opined at that point that Prophet (s) could lose his mental faculties, with the words then he could likewise lose his fight for life. Lest not forget the words of Rasulullah (s) on his death bed “Come near so that Allah’s Apostle may write for you a writing after which you will not go astray” The words “you will not go astray” clearly evidences Rasulullah (s) was making a will that needed to be adhered permanently after him, as his eternal legacy. If Umar refused to believe that the Prophet (s) could die, why did he not as part of his intervention, not highlight that the Prophet (s) could not die, so why was he trying to dictate a will!
As for Dr Ibn al Hashimi’s insistence that these symptoms were all part and parcel of grieving we will point out that grieving as per the article cited earlier takes at a minimum six months you don’t just miraculously snap out of it and return to normality within hours as Umar had done. This is a medically researched fact, that entitles us to question the genuineness of Umar’s conduct.
Ibn al Hashimi argues:
Furthermore, it is well-known that many Shia claim that the Prophet (صلّى الله عليه وآله وسلّم) is omnipresent even today, and they cite as evidence the same Quranic verse (2:143). They argue that this verse says that the Prophet (صلّى الله عليه وآله وسلّم) is a witness over us and this can only mean that he is omnipresent, witnessing everything that we do. If the Shia can believe such a blasphemous idea, then why should they of all people have anything against Umar (رضّى الله عنه) temporarily thinking that perhaps the Prophet (صلّى الله عليه وآله وسلّم) would be the last of them to die?
As for the suggestion that believing that the Prophet (s) is omnipresent is blasphemous, is this only a Shia belief? Certainly not, and his beloved Ansar.Org cited this very fact in their article on Imamate. In their rebuttal, their darling Afriqi stated:
The second meaning also finds ample support in the Qur’an. In another ayah Allah says:
How will it be when We bring forth from every Ummah a witness, and bring you (O Muhammad) as a witness over these? (an-Nisa’:41)
A witness is that individual who can provide direct eye witness corroboration to an event. If for example a murder takes place a witness will be that person who saw one person, shoot the other, that person can be summoned as a witness as he actually saw the incident as and when it happened. When (according to the verse cited) the Prophet (s) will act as a witness for EVERY Ummah (past and present) from now until the Day of Judgment then you have to accept that he is witness to the deeds of every dead until the Day of Judgment. Curiously rather than accept this, Ibn al Hashimi rejects the notion of our Prophet (s) being alive, present and watching over us. You can only be witness to an event, if you are present, how can Afriqi believe that Muhammad (s) will be witness to the deeds of his Ummah when Ibn al Hashimi views such a belief as blasphemous? Whose Salafi position is correct here, Afriki or that of Ibn al Hashimi?
What we find most interesting is that a few years earlier Umar was of the opinion that not only could the Prophet (saaws) die, he was dead. This occurred during the Battle of Uhud when Khalid bin Waleed mounted an onslaught on the Muslims, the enemy raised the battle cry that the Prophet (saaws) had been killed Umar was amongst those companions who had left the Prophet (saaws)’s side and sought refuge in the mountains. Anas b. Malik approached Umar b. Khattab who to quote Shibli Numani:
“had thrown away his sword in despair, “What are you doing here?”, he asked. Umar (Allah be pleased with him) replied, “What should we fight for now. The Holy Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) is no more living”. Ibn Nadr said “It is no good to be living when he is no more”, said Nadr; and saying this he dashed in to the enemy ranks and died fighting”.
This event has also been recorded by al Tabari.
Ibn al Hashimi argues:
To the lay-person this may seem like a viable argument, but to anyone who has gone through psychiatry in medical school, Answering-Ansar’s argument would seem sophomoric at best. We read:
The bereaved may invent stories, sometimes so complex as to be bizarre, to explain away the deceased’s absence…in spite of having seen the deceased’s body with one’s own eyes…[we would] intuitively assume that the bereaved would affirm the loss on seeing the deceased’s body or attending the funeral; however, this is not the case: the distortions of reality can sometimes become firmer with such “evidence.” This paradoxical effect is believed to be a result of the intensely emotional and traumatizing nature of such “evidence” (i.e. seeing the dead body) which causes the bereaved to have a flight from reality as a defense mechanism…
The bereaved may at first seem to accept the news of a loved one’s death, but later this may not be the case after having viewed the body (especially if the body is mangled, etc.) or attending the funeral…the more emotional and traumatic the experience, the higher the likelihood…of a flight from reality…
(Grief Counseling, American Psychiatric Association)
Dr. Elisabeth Kubler-Ross, a Swiss psychiatrist, is the one credited with having systematized the “stages of grief” used by psychiatrists and psychologists worldwide. The five stages of grief are: denial, anger, bargaining, grieving, and acceptance. According to Dr. Kubler-Ross, however, there is a lag time before a person enters the period of grief. It is this lag time which she termed as the “period of shock.” Dr. Kubler-Ross described shock as a feeling of “unreality”, or a feeling of numbness. During this time period, the first thing a person does is immediately stop doing whatever he is doing, or even drop whatever he is holding and fall down.
It is quite clear that Umar (رضّى الله عنه) was in shock when he heard the rumor of the Prophet’s death during the Battle of Uhud. He immediately stopped doing whatever he was doing (i.e. fighting), dropped whatever he was holding (i.e. dropped his sword), and fell down in a state of non-responsiveness. Had things developed further, it is likely that Umar (رضّى الله عنه) would have entered into the next phase, or the first stage of grief (which comes after shock). Had Umar (رضّى الله عنه) seen the Prophet’s mutilated corpse on the battlefield of Uhud, then this would definitely be characterized as an “emotional and traumatic experience” that could cause “a flight from reality.” However, such an event did not take place, and instead the Sahabah were reassured that the Prophet (صلّى الله عليه وآله وسلّم) was in fact alive, thereby cutting short the cycle of grief. In other words, Answering-Ansar’s conspiracy theories do not have any medical basis whatsoever, as Umar’s reaction was a classic textbook case. It should be noted that Umar (رضّى الله عنه) was known to be a highly emotional and dramatic person, so it is not at all strange that he would react in such a strong manner. Was it not Umar (رضّى الله عنه) who was complimented by the Prophet (صلّى الله عليه وآله وسلّم) for this very trait, a quality that he used in the protection of Islam against the Enemies of Allah?
Once more Ibn al Hashimi presses his medical credentials to dupe his audience, to relying on the famous maxim ‘Trust me I’m a doctor’ – but he has sought to explain Umar’s conduct without looking in to the other responses adopted by him on that day. If this theory is to be applied to this ‘emotional and dramatic person’ then it would have meant that he effectively froze and remained frozen for the remainder of the battle, as the shock of the news had overtaken him, meaning that he was incapable of doing anything else. The truth is he did more than just sit around, he fled the battlefield when the enemy attacked the Muslim ranks. The ability to flee so as to protect one’s own life are not the traits of a shocked man, frozen incapable of fighting, fleeing are the traits of cowardice.
The fact of the matter is when Ibn Nadr confronted Umar to explain why he had desisted from fighting, he had fled the battlefield, so sought to defend this shameless act by suggesting that it was because Rasulullah (s) had died. The crucial thing is Umar at no point said that he stopped fighting on account of shock, he acknowledged he fled to protect his life. This can be evidenced via Umar’s very own testimony in Tafsir al-Dur al-Manthur, volume 2 page 88:
أخرج إبن جرير ، عن كليب قال : خطب عمر يوم الجمعة فقرأ : آل عمران وكان يعجبه إذا خطب أن يقرأها ، فلما إنتهى إلى قوله : إن الذين تولوا منكم يوم التقى الجمعان ، قال : لما كان يوم أحد هزمناهم ففررت حتى صعدت الجبل فلقد رأيتنى أنزو كأنني أروى
Kluayb said: Umar addressed us on Friday and recites a verse from al-Emran, and he used recite this verse whenever he address, when reached the part {Those of you who turned back on the day the two hosts Met } he commented: on day of Uhud I ran away and climbed the mountain and jumped like the mountain sheep.
An individual in a state of shock remains frozen; he doesn’t seek to save his life by jumping around like a mountain goat. One shocked would not have the mental abilities to consider the risk that he faced, he would experience a state wherein he was frozen not knowing / caring what was going on around him!
Umar’s fleeing that was by his own admission tantamount to a sheep jumping mountain tops are the traits of one exhibiting cowardice, seeking to save himself from the enemy, these are not the traits of one suffering from shock, that in itself proves that his comments to Ibn Nadr were a ruse.
Now returning to the topic at hand, compare the two different approaches, Umar had heard that the Prophet (saaws) was dead. Without inquiring in to the matter he abandoned fighting and took refuge in the mountains. What better time would there have been for Umar to have shown his affection for the Prophet (saaws) by urging the companions not to listen to rumor. Why did Umar not insist that the Prophet (saaws) could not die? Why did he not seek to console the dejected troops by asserting that if the Prophet (saaws) was indeed missing it was due to the fact that he was in communication with Allah (swt) as Musa (as) was when he descended to Mount Sinai? Why did Umar not insist that the companions ignore rumors of the Prophet (saaws)’s death and continue to fight? Rather than dropping his sword, what better time would there have been for Umar to hold aloft his sword and declare to the Muslims that ‘the Prophet (saaws) cannot die, let us continue the fight, I will kill anyone who says that the Prophet (saaws) is dead’. Yet we read that Umar chose to adopt a more nonchalant attitude, he was quite content to listen to the rumor and accept it.
Now look at the completely different response upon the death of the Prophet (saaws), now Umar was holding his sword aloft threatening those who said that the Prophet (saaws) was dead. Alas if only that same vehemence had been adopted in Uhud.
Let us compare the two events:
| 3 Hijri | 11 Hijri |
| Umar hears that the Prophet (saaws) has been killed, he has not seen evidence to that effect | Umar knows that the Holy Prophet (saaws) is deceased. |
| Relying on the rumor Umar drops his sword, stops fighting and flees for the mountain area. | Umar denies that the Prophet (saaws) is dead, knowing full well that his body is lying in Ayesha’s chambers. He seeks to create an impression that it is a rumor. |
| Umar believes the rumor to the extent that he feels that there is longer a reason to fight when the Holy Prophet (saaws) is dead. | Umar holds aloft his sword and threatens to kill anyone who says that the Holy Prophet (saaws) is dead. |
There was clearly more to it, something was happening and even the staunch Sunni scholar Numani admits that the actions of Umar in denying the death of the Prophet (saaws) and threatening to kill those who spread the news was because:
“Omar may have deemed it politic to suppress the news as there was a large number of hypocrites in Madinah who were only waiting for the Prophet’s death to ferment trouble”.
Al Faruq, by Allamah Shibli Numani, Vol 1 p 87
Ibn al Hashimi insists:
This was simply a theory by one author and it has no basis. Modern psychiatry and psychology have afforded us an opportunity to clearly understand the basis for Umar’s denial of the Prophet’s death, and therefore, it seems altogether unnecessary to probe into the matter further.
We have already debased Ibn al Hashimi’s efforts to rationalise Umar’s conduct by placing him on a psychiatrists couch, the other aspects of his conduct, namely his cowardice and physical ability to flee the battlefield, negates the suggestion that his conduct were the traits of a shocked individual! With that theory refuted we are faced with the conduct of a man that is particularly curious, that thus makes Numani’s analysis quite plausible, particularly when one sees what happens next, namely his ability to compose himself and head out to debate with the Ansar.
Now, returning to Numani’s rationalisation, of his conduct, namely that it was merely to stave of the evil machinations of the hypocrites Umar should have tried to suppress this information for as long as possible. He would have tried to convey these worries to Abu Bakr. But this did not happen on the contrary upon Abu Bakr confirming that the Prophet (saaws) was dead Umar’s fear of a hypocrite conspiracy instantly vanished. It should have continued and in fact Umar should have continued to insist that the Prophet (saaws) was not dead. Upon Abu Bakr’s confirmation of the news, was the fear of hypocrites not still just as prevalent? Would the threat from hypocrites have diminished by one sermon? Umar readily accepts Abu Bakr’s words and sees no fear from hypocrites, a risk of a hypocrite conspiracy has been quelled by Abu Bakr confirming what was already known – that the Holy Prophet (saaws) was dead.
We should also ask Numani supporters the crucial question ‘if there was a perceived threat from Umar of hypocrites in Madinah then would he not have viewed it as a priority to deal with them following Abu Bakr’s inauguration at Saqifa?’ As a close personal adviser of the Khalifa surely Umar would have aired his concerns to Abu Bakr and suggested they be uprooted and be dealt with as a matter of urgency. Unfortunately Numani’s hypothesis does not tally up with reality. Neither Abu Bakr nor Umar ever perceived any threats from the hypocrites. Had they feared the machinations of the hypocrites Abu Bakr would have dealt with them in the same determined way that he dealt with those who refused to pay Zakat to him and those who had turned apostate – he would have declared an all out war on them and annihilated them. This did not happen and so there exist no grounds to support Numani’s conclusion.
The reality is Umar was merely seeking to stall time he was waiting for Abu Bakr to arrive from Sukh. Whilst some might view Umar’s actions as those of a devastated distraught man, one will note how swiftly these feelings of distress evaporate upon Abu Bakr’s inaugural speech, in which he quoted a Qur’anic verse that the Prophet (saaws) like other men could also die. With the recital of this verse Umar became convinced that the Prophet (saaws) was dead [The History of al Tabari, Vol 9 page 185, English translation by Ismail Poonawalla]. We should remind our readers that the same Umar (saws) who prevented the Prophet from writing a will on his deathbed by saying that the “Qur’an is sufficient for us”, had no recollection of this verse. Upon hearing the verse, the distress vanishes, Umar’s obscure behaviour changes. Normally the response of a distressed man would be to become traumatized by the tragic loss of a loved one and to develop symptoms of shock and horror at the devastating news. Umar reacted very differently his shock is temporary, it completely evaporates within a matter seconds, he in fact makes such a remarkable recovery that he is well and confident enough to make a journey to the Saqifa, put the death behind him and debate about the Khilafat.
Ibn al Hashimi argues:
Answering-Ansar has outdone themselves in creating a very fanciful and creative conspiracy theory. Instead of viewing things as an unbiased person who would naturally assume that indeed Umar (رضّى الله عنه) was a distressed and distraught man, the Shia put on their conspiracy caps and ask us to believe that this was all some sort of ploy. And of course, they make such grandoise claims without a shred of evidence to back themselves up.
We need not even deal with Answering-Ansar’s conspiracy tales, but let us play along: the Shia argument is that Umar (رضّى الله عنه) denied the Prophet’s death in order to prevent Ali (رضّى الله عنه) from declaring himself Caliph in the absence of Abu Bakr (رضّى الله عنه) . If indeed this was the case, then why would the Shaikhayn immediately head out towards Saqifah leaving Ali (رضّى الله عنه) and others of the Banu Hashim at the Prophet’s house? Would this then not be the ideal time for Ali (رضّى الله عنه) to declare his Caliphate, in the presence of his supporters from his own family? If what Answering-Ansar is claiming is true, then the last thing the Shaikhayn would do is leave Ali (رضّى الله عنه) un-supervised! If Umar (رضّى الله عنه) feared that Ali (رضّى الله عنه) would declare his Caliphate in the absence of Abu Bakr (رضّى الله عنه) , then why would Umar (رضّى الله عنه) inform Abu Bakr (رضّى الله عنه) that they must head out towards Saqifah? Surely, the Shia arguments make no sense!
Why would the Banu Hashim see the need to declare Ali (as) as the Caliph? This entire argument is based on the nonsensical Sunni belief that the Prophet (s) neither appointed an individual not left a system of succession. As far as we are concerned, Ali (as) had already been appointed as the successor of the Prophet (s) at Ghadir Khumm, and the Sahaba had already attested to this fact, that included Umar. When Ali (as) had already been appointed as the Head of State by Rasulullah (s) during the lifetime of the Prophet (s) what would be the need for Banu Hashim to appoint him as such? There was no need to supervise the Banu Hashim, Umar knew fully well the significance of Ghadir and the appointment of Ali (as) therein, he was now seeking to quash that appointment via discussions at Saqifa.
Ibn al Hashimi argues:
Another blatant lie. Answering-Ansar is claiming that as soon as Abu Bakr (رضّى الله عنه) came and said those words that suddenly Umar (رضّى الله عنه) was alright. Far from it. Umar (رضّى الله عنه) said:
“By Allah, when I heard Abu Bakr reciting it, my legs could not support me and I fell down at the very moment of hearing him reciting it, declaring that the Prophet had died.”
(Sahih Bukhari: Volume 5, Book 59, Number 733)
What exactly evaporates in a matter of seconds? Umar (رضّى الله عنه) does not immediately smile and waltz to Saqifah, as Answering-Ansar is portraying. Instead, upon hearing Abu Bakr (رضّى الله عنه) confirm the Prophet’s death, Umar’s legs gave away and he fell to the ground in grief and devestation. And this state of devestation continued for some time, and then slowly Umar (رضّى الله عنه) got the will-power to help taking care of the Prophet’s funeral arrangements. And then only after some more time did a man rush to Umar (رضّى الله عنه) begging him to come out; Umar (رضّى الله عنه) at first rebuffed this man, but only assented to the man’s desire after he was convinced that it was a national state of emergency.
Note how has Ibn al Hashimi conjured something in to the text that is not there. He says Umar fell to the ground “And this state of devestation continued for some time, and then slowly Umar (رضّى الله عنه) got the will-power to help taking care of the Prophet’s funeral arrangements”where is his evidence for this? The text certainly does not suggest he lay on the ground like crestfallen individual. Now Ibn al Hashimi has relied on medical research to suggest that there are several stages of bereavement, the first being grief, that explained away his curious behaviour, could he elaborate why none of the other stages of bereavement then kicked in? How was Umar able to recover forthwith and then head out to Saqifa, like some super hero out to save the nation from disaster? If he is going to rely on psychiatry to explain Umar’s conduct why are the other stages missing? The ability to recover from bereavement so swiftly is indeed impressive, particularly when Umar was able to head out and play the role of king maker at Saqifa. All this within a matter of hours of hearing the Prophet (s) died and exhibiting signs of bereavement. Such a turn around is indeed very impressive and unprecedented in history!
!
Ibn al Hashimi argues:
As a side-note, Answering-Ansar says “his shock is temporary it completely evaporates within a matter seconds.” To anyone having gone through medical school, such a statement is laughable, considering the fact that the very definition of the word “shock” is that it is temporary and fleeting! A truly laughable mistake of the Answering-Ansar lay-persons
If Ibn al Hashimi is to be believed Umar was exhibiting the classic traits of bereavement, shock being the first stage. Let us accept that shock means temporary, if Ibn al Hashimi’s medical opinion is correct this shock would have then led seamlessly in to the other stages of bereavement, they would have not just extinguished and enabled Umar to return to ‘reality’. Shock may indeed be a temporary thing as opined by Ibn al Hashimi, but the ability to recover from that shock is not immediate rather it takes time. We are quoting from the BBC health website:
There are various types of shock with varying causes.
This may be caused by:
While psychological shock is less likely to kill you than physiological shock, its effects can persist for years and cause immense disruption.
Mild shocks leave you feeling stunned for a while, absorbed in your thoughts and unable to focus on anything else. After a while, though, the brain gets the event in perspective and normal life resumes.
However, especially if the shock is more profound, some people find it harder to return to normal, and may develop post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This tends to affect people in one of three ways:
It’s essential that PTSD is recognised and treated properly because the earlier it’s treated, the greater the chance it can be cured.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/health/emotional_health/mental_health/disorders_shock1.shtml
The effects of PTSD have long lasting impacts a fact well recognised by the medical profession, something that Dr al Hashimi no doubt if fully aware of, it for this precise reason that the US army invested millions of dollars into research to aid Vietnam war veterans that suffered from PTSD upon their return to the United States.
We learn how Umar receives exclusive information of the meeting at Saqifa. The man from the Ansar specifically calls Umar outside.
In al Hashimi argues:
Keeping the spirit of conspiracy theory, Answering-Ansar now uses cloak-and-dagger terms such as “the inside informant.” Is this for dramatic effect? If so, it is a complete failure and only shows how desperate and far-fetched the Shia theories are. Indeed, this was not the work of the Israeli Mossad or the American CIA, but rather it was only one singular man who had witnessed what was happening at Saqifah, saw that the Ansars were ready to declare war on the Muhajirs, and then quickly went to the Prophet’s house to warn of this danger. And at the Prophet’s Mosque, this man saw Umar (رضّى الله عنه) and so informed him of what was happening. Unfortunately, reality is more mundane than the Shia sensationalists imply: a man informed Umar (رضّىb الله عنه) , that is all. Nothing more sensational than that.
Farfetched Shia theories? Ibn al Hashimi needs to look at what he has just written. He suggests that “the Ansars were ready to declare war on the Muhajirs” – how did he interpret their gathering at Saqifa as evidence of their being ready to declare war on the Muhajirin Sahaba? How has he interpreted this fact, when the informant says nothing to this effect to Umar? Were they armed to the teeth with weaponry, or did he have a line tap listening in on the war talk from inside the room of Saqifa? To suggest that the Ansar, companions of Rasulullah (s) who as per Ibn al Hashimi’s beliefs are all just and truthful were preparing to kill their Muhajirin brothers for power is indeed a slur against the Sahaba, for which the author needs to seek penance from his fellow Salafis. Moreover, if war was genuinely being declared on the Ansar then why would the Sheikhain have headed off in to this war situation unarmed? We know that the Umar for example was particularly averse to the risk of injury in wars, and in fact refused to go to the Kuffar when the Hudaibya negotiations were ongoing fearing that they would kill him, so how was he now in effect going into the lion’s den unarmed? If war was indeed about to be declared there is no doubt the Sheikhain would have brought men to counter this threat.
Umar learns that the Ansar have gathered inside the Saqifa he calls Abu Bakr and the both set off in the direction of the meeting. The information is kept hidden from all the other companions. In this day and age one regularly learns of public outcry’s when information is hidden from the public information which is in the public interest, which they might want I say it could for example be on an issue which concerns there future well being of the country’s citizens. Now the question one must ask here is ‘Was the issue of a secret meeting which could lead to civil strife’ not in the public interest?’ Did the companions not have a right to know about it? What right did Umar have to keep the matter a secret? If the meeting was so crucial why could other prominent companions not also have been told invited to attend? Why was this information so ‘top secret’?
In al Hashimi argues:
Once again, Answering-Ansar has resorted to using Mission Impossible words, such as “top secret.” We wonder how any unbiased person can take Shia history seriously, as it is all based on a giant conspiracy theory. In any case, what exactly was top secret? Was there any evidence at all that Abu Bakr (رضّى الله عنه) and Umar (رضّى الله عنه) hid the information from anyone? All that happened was that they decided to rush towards Saqifah in order to diffuse the problem. There is no evidence that they were hiding this information. In fact, we find that on the way Abu Bakr (رضّى الله عنه) and Umar (رضّى الله عنه) met Abu Ubaidah (رضّى الله عنه) , and they told Abu Ubaidah (رضّى الله عنه) about the situation quite openly. Furthermore, they met two Ansars on the way, and the Shaikhayn (Abu Bakr and Umar) even informed them about their intentions of going to Saqifah. So quite contrary to what Answering-Ansar is saying, there is no “top secret” and the Shaikhayn openly told people they met what was going on. However, they were in a rush to go to Saqifah and therefore they did not have the time to “round up the troops”.
They took Abu Ubaydah with them to assist them in the coup. He was a master tactician and in fact sought to placate an irate Ali (as) after Saqifa, when he made it clear than none could deny the excellences of Ali (as) (al Imama wa al Siyasa). They met Ansar i.e. those at Saqifa, so in many ways they were making clear of their intentions. Why did they not deem it important to let the other Muhajireen know of their intentions? Would there not be a greater expectation of both father in laws to stay juxtaposition at the bedside of Rasulullah (s)? Could they not have appointed other men of influence to stave off the machinations of the Ansar? What gave them to act of their own accord, not seeking the advice of the other Sahaba? Did they have some mandate from Rasulullah (s) to act as his advisers should a national emergency occur?
In al Hashimi argues:
Having said all that, we must correct Answering-Ansar on another point, simply for the sake that they are saying ridicolous things that cannot go un-corrected. Answering-Ansar asks “Was the issue of a secret meeting which could lead to civil strife not in the public interest?” We are very sorry to burst Answering-Ansar’s bubble, but in such a situation any capable leader would in fact deem it in the national interest to keep such information surpressed from the public. If the news were to become disseminated that the Ansars were ready to enforce their Caliph over everyone else (even through the force of arms), this would have resulted in civil disorder, mass chaos, and public pandemonium. Angry people from other tribes would get up in arms and march out to fight the Ansars so that their own Caliph could be instated. It is in fact a very fortuitous thing that Abu Bakr (رضّى الله عنه) went with only two Companions instead of a whole pack of Muhajirs. Had he done the latter, it is likely that the Ansars would feel threatened and things would easily have gone to blows. The Shaikhayn and Abu Ubaidah (رضّى الله عنه) were in fact an envoy of peace whose sole purpose was to prevent the Ansars from angering the masses. Indeed, whilst on the way to Saqifah, these three Muhajirs did in fact meet an Ansar who told them to go back to their own people and declare their own Caliph. Abu Bakr (رضّى الله عنه) instead chose to be very political in this very precarious situation and diffuse the situation in a careful–as opposed to reckless–manner. In any case, this is all a non-issue because Abu Bakr (رضّى الله عنه) and Umar (رضّى الله عنه) had no time to gather the Muhajirs as the Ansars were only moments away from declaring their own Caliph; the Shaikhayn therefore could afford no waste of time (i.e. they could not take out the time to round up the Muhajirs) and instead rushed to Saqifah posthaste.
What defence is Ibn al Hashimi filing for his clients here? Was it they kept it hidden intentionally to curtail potential trouble from rival tribes or was it they simply didn’t have time? They both can’t be correct, so which one is correct?
First and foremost Abu Bakr was not a leader, so he had no right to act as one and partake in discussions that would affect the entire community. He had no delegated authority to do so, Rasulullah (s) did not appoint him, so who gave him the mandate to head out to Saqifa and represent the interests of the entire Muslim populous? As for this comment:
If the news were to become disseminated that the Ansars were ready to enforce their Caliph over everyone else (even through the force of arms), this would have resulted in civil disorder, mass chaos, and public pandemonium. Angry people from other tribes would get up in arms and march out to fight the Ansars so that their own Caliph could be instated.
Would the simpler solution not have been for Rasulullah (s) to stave of these difficulties and appoint a Head of State, thus stopping any such machination in their tracks? Is it really plausible he neither appointed a successor nor devised a system of succession? Ibn al Hashimi’s tribute to the Shaikhain is they did that which was need to stave off Fitnah, No, on the contrary Rasulullah (s) had told his followers where to turn in times of fitnah, he said:
‘There will be affliction after me, therefore when ever it happens follow Ali bin Abi Talib because he separates between the truth and falsehood (Farooq)’
Kanz ul Ummal, Volume 11 page 914 Hadith 32964
The duty was to attach themselves to Ali (as) NOT to separate from him, we also have these explicit words of Rasulullah (s):
After me people shall experience fitna, you will split into groups, he then pointed at Ali and said: ‘Ali and his companions shall be on the right path’
Kanz ul Ummal, Volume 11 page 621 Hadith number 33016
From this tradition it is clear that the ONLY way that the Ummah could save itself from fitnah and division was to side with Imam ‘Ali (as). If we are to accept the argument of Ibn al Hashimi if the Ansar were planning a bloody coup to attain power, then this was fitnah of the highest order, why did the Shaikhain not seek to find Ali (as) who Rasulullah (s) had designated as the man to resolve Fitnah?
One would have expected the forum for debating the issue of succession would be a grand one, but the reality is it took place at a place “where Arabs would meet to scheme evil activities”. 1
Ghiyathu’l lughat, by Ghiyath’d-Din, p 228 by Muhammad ibn Jalaladeen Rampuri Ghiyathu’din (Nawal Kishor Press, Lucknow, 1867)
In al Hashimi argues:
The Ghiyathu’l lughat by Ghiyath’d-Din…? What on earth is that? What kind of obscure and unheard of text are the Shia propagandists trying to pass off as an “authoratative Sunni text” when we have never heard of it? In fact, based on the name, this text is likely a dictionary of some sort.
In any case, the Shaikhayn and Abu Ubaidah (رضّى الله عنه) were not the ones to choose the venue. As has been discussed thoroughly, it was the Ansars who assembled at Saqifah and the three Muhajirs were forced to go there in order to stop them from nominating their own Caliph. The Ansars were the cause of the gathering. Abu Bakr (رضّى الله عنه) and Umar (رضّى الله عنه) were forced to proceed to Saqifah in order to prevent a civil war. The election of Abu Bakr (رضّى الله عنه) was something un-premeditated and purely spontaneous. To this effect, Umar (رضّى الله عنه) said:
“The pledge of allegiance given to Abu Bakr was an un-premeditated spontaneous affair which was (then only later) ratified.”
(Sahih Bukhari, Volume 8, Book 82, Number 817)
This is a dictionary and the Sunni author has provided this definition of Saqifa that entitles us to rely upon it. Let us for arguments sake accept that the choice of venue was not of the Shaikhain own making, the fact of the matter is the same men who were happy to attend this meeting and debate on leadership, should have at least pointed out that this approach was incorrect and insisted that the matter be discussed in an open forum, namely the mosque of the Prophet (s), after Rasulullah (s) had been laid to rest, yet they at no point suggested that matters be suspended until wider consultation was sought, why not? Why should an issue of such primary importance be discussed in a place such as this? Would you consider this to be an appropriate to discuss the selection of any post let alone that of the Prophet (saaws)’s successor? Why this small secret venue? Would a better venue not had been the Prophet (saaws)’s Mosque – where all could attend and speak freely upon the matter? Why did the three Muhajireen not raise this option? They raise no objection to the venue and the issue is thawed out between the two parties.
Note Ibn al Hashimi’s use of the false term ‘election of Abu Bakr were the shenanigans at Saqifa part of a valid electoral process? Is this how the Head of State for the Ummah is elected, at a clandestine meeting between a handful of men?
In al Hashimi argues:
When Abu Bakr (رضّى الله عنه), Umar (رضّى الله عنه), and Abu Ubaidah (رضّى الله عنه) arrived at Saqifah, they came to know of the resolve of the Ansars (i.e. in seeking to nominate their own man to Caliphate); and so these three Muhajirs attempted to persuade the Ansars to change their minds. The Ansars waivered and the Muhajirs jumped on this opportunity to resolve the conflict. Some people might ask: why didn’t the Shaikhayn or Abu Ubaidah (رضّى الله عنه) suggest delaying the nomination of the Caliph until all of the Muhajirs (such as Ali) could be summoned? Umar (رضّى الله عنه) himself explained the reason:
“…because we were afraid that if we left the people (without rendering the oath of allegiance), they might (in our absence) give the pledge of allegiance after us to one of their men…”
(Sahih Bukhari, Volume 8, Book 82, Number 817)
In a slightly different version, Umar (رضّى الله عنه) explained:
“We feared that if we left (without rendering the oath of allegiance), no agreement would be hammered out (with the Ansar) later. (And if they then elected one of their own men) it was either to follow the Ansar in what we did not approve of (i.e. disobey the Prophet’s words), or else oppose them (i.e. with the sword), which would have led to disorder (fasad).”
(History of al-Tabari, Vol. 9, p.194)
Abu Bakr (رضّى الله عنه) would later say to Ali (رضّى الله عنه):
“Had I delayed the matter, it would have posed a greater danger to the unity, integrity, and solidarity of Islam. How could I send for you when there was no time?”
(Tareekh al-Islam, Vol.1, p.276)
They could have agreed to suspend matters or sent for the Muhajirin, is the author not the same individual that quotes the importance of shura ad nausea? Was this not the most opportune moment to implement the said principle by calling upon the subjects of the Prophet (s) situate in Madina to come together and appoint the man to lead them after the death of their leader? Why the fear that they might appoint a Head of State when their back was turned? Are all the Sahaba not just and truthful? Is Ibn al Hashimi inferring that Umar was concerned over dishonesty on the part of the Sahaba?
Those debating at Saqifa were the Ansar (vast bulk of the tribe) and what historians have incorrectly quoted the Muhajireen. The Sunni group Idara Isha’at e diniyat (P) Ltd. undoubtedly fully aware of the true facts seek to convince their readership that a free and frank debate involving all the companions occurred, they write:
“After the demise of Rasulullah Sallallahu alahi wa sallam all the prominent Sahaba Radhialllahu anhum gathered at a place called the Saqifa Bani Saad”.
What one should ask this group is why were only three prominent companions from the Muhajireen present at Saqifa? Were men such as Ali and the other members of Banu Hashim, Uthman, Talha, Zubair, Sa’d bin Abi Waqqas not prominent?
The modern day Sunni scholar El Awa manages to clarify this incorrect approach as follows:
“To consider the Muhajirin as party is incorrect because those of the Muhajirin who attended the Saqifa meeting were Abu Bakr, Umar b. Al Khattab, and Abu ‘Ubaida b. al-Jarrah. The Muhajirin had not delegated them any authority nor did they represent any specific political group connected with them”.
In al Hashimi argues:
We have already repeatedly responded to this accusation. The Ansars were just about to finalize the nomination of their own Caliph; Abu Bakr (رضّى الله عنه) and Umar (رضّى الله عنه) had to rush towards Saqifah before this could happen. There was, therefore, no time to round up the Muhajirs. In reality, the fact that Abu Bakr (رضّى الله عنه) took along with him only two people is a strong evidence that Abu Bakr (رضّى الله عنه) had no intention of taking the Caliphate for himself, because if this had been the case, then he surely would have taken along with him more of his own supporters.
Wrong had more people known, questions would have been raised as to why they were heading out to Saqifa when Ali (as) had already been appointed as the Khalifa by Rasulullah (s) at Ghadir Khumm. That would have immediately frustrated the ability of both men to head out to Saqifa. The desire to ‘rush’ was motivated by a desire to get there and argue their case that was focused on removing Ali (as) from the equation. Moreover there was no particular difficulty in rounding up the Muhajirs since they were all within close proximity of them as they were gathered near to the home of the Prophet (s) where his body remained in situ. Abu Bakr was present in that very house, where other Muhajir were likewise present, so why did he not seek to mobilise supporters then make his way to Saqifa? Had he not heard of the notion ‘strength in numbers’? If so why was he seeking his utmost to ensure that the matter as covert as possible?
At Saqifa the central argument advanced by both sides was over tribal superiority. The entire event consisted of arguments over which side was better. The Saqifa managed to re-ignite the differences that The Holy Prophet (saaws) had throughout his mission sought to eliminate. He had declared that both tribes were brothers, it was a far cry from the famous sermon during the Final Pilgrimage when the Prophet (saaws) said all are equal in Allah (swt)’s eyes and that the closest to Allah (swt) are those who are pious. This sermon had been completely erased at Saqifa tribal rivalries that during the lifetime of the Prophet (saaws) had been subdued were rekindled. A ‘them’ and ‘us’ attitude was quite evident if one analyses the speeches given.
In al Hashimi argues:
The “us vs them” debate at Saqifah was between the Ansars on the one hand and the Muhajirs on the other hand. Neither the “Ansars” nor the “Muhajirs” were a tribe and therefore it is incorrect to say that this was a debate about tribal rivalries or Assabiyyah (bigotry/tribalism). The Ansars were made up of the Aws and the Khazraj, who have historically been warring tribes; in fact, before the advent of Islam, the Aws and the Khazraj had been locked into a hundred year long Hatfield and McCoy feud. So how then can the Shia refer to the Ansars as a tribal unit? The term “Ansars” (Helpers) therefore did not at all refer to a specific tribal group but rather it was a term bestowed upon those who helped the Muhajirs. As for the Muhajirs, they were a small segment of the Quraish who were historically in opposition to the rest of the Quraish. The “Muhajirs” (Emigrants) were a group not defined by their tribal affiliation but rather on the merit of having been of those who emigrated in the Cause of Allah. These were two groups defined not by their lineage but rather by their merits and deeds; therefore, the question arose as to whether the leadership should fall to those who emigrated in the Path of Allah or those who helped them.
The spirit of Islam is that people should be awarded based upon their merits and accomplishments, not because of their lineage or family. The three Muhajirs were arguing for the Caliphate based upon their merits, accomplishments, and service for Islam. Abu Bakr (رضّى الله عنه) argues:
“(We were) the first on earth to worship Allah (in Islam) and we were the patrons (of the Prophet) and the supporting group of the Prophet. (It is we) who tolerated (great suffering) and suffered with him (through many) adversities…”
(History of al-Tabari, Volume 3, p.219)
The arguments Abu Bakr (رضّى الله عنه) made on his own behalf were all about good deeds, merits, and accomplishments; therefore, we cannot accuse him of Assabiyyah (bigotry/tribalism). Abu Bakr (رضّى الله عنه) himself only furthered the religious and spiritual arguments (i.e. the merits of the Muhajirs), and he only mentioned the practical and socio-political arguments (i.e. the position of the Quraish in relation to the other tribes) as the views held by the general public, not by himself; the latter were important only insofar as maintaining the unity of the fledgling Muslim empire. This distinction–between religious and socio-political reasons–is important to understand.
Abu Bakr (رضّى الله عنه) was not saying that he himself viewed the Ansars as inferior because of their tribal affiliations. In fact, Abu Bakr (رضّى الله عنه) acknowledged the greatness and accomplishments of the Ansars. Abu Bakr (رضّى الله عنه) and Umar (رضّى الله عنه) only reminded the Ansars that whereas they themselves acknowledged the greatness of the Ansars, this was not true for the masses of Arabia. Again, this was not the view of the Shaikhayn but rather the very real public opinion of the various tribes of Arabia. The Shia propagandists may accuse Abu Bakr (رضّى الله عنه) and Umar (رضّى الله عنه) of “inventing” this excuse and using the public opinion as a guise for their own selfish interests; however, unfortunately for them, it was the Prophet (صلّى الله عليه وآله وسلّم) himself who voiced these concerns and the Shaikhayn were simply repeating what the Prophet (صلّى الله عليه وآله وسلّم) had said. The Prophet (صلّى الله عليه وآله وسلّم) had said:
“After me, the political authority shall be transferred to the Quraish.”
(Musnad Ahmad Ibn Hambal, vol. 3, p. 183)
The Prophet (صلّى الله عليه وآله وسلّم) clearly explained the reason for this:
“People (ofArabia) in this matter (i.e. leadership) follow the Quraish. The believers ofArabiaare the followers of their believers and the disbelievers ofArabiaare the followers of their disbelievers.”
(Muslim, Kitabu’l-Imarah)
Abu Bakr (رضّى الله عنه) said:
“(O Ansar) you are our brethren in Islam and our partners in religion…but the Arabs will not submit themselves except to this clan of Quraish…we (the Quraish) are in the center among the Muslims with respect to our position…”
(The History of al-Tabari, Volume 9, p.193)
Likewise, we read:
He (Abu Bakr) said: “All the good that you have said about yourselves (O Ansars) is deserved. But the Arabs will recognize authority only in this clan of Quraish, they being (considered) the best of the Arabs in blood and country. I offer you one of these two men (Umar and Abu Ubaidah): accept whom you please.’ ”
(Ibn Ishaq, Seerah Rasool-Allah)
Notice that Abu Bakr (رضّى الله عنه) himself acknowledged the greatness of the Ansars, but he was merely pointing out that the Arab masses did not feel the same way. Likewise, did Umar (رضّى الله عنه) say that “the rest of Arabia would never accept a non-Quraish (leader).” It was not the Shaikhayn’s own viewpoint, but rather it was the view of the various tribes that had only recently come into the folds of Islam after the Quraish of Mecca had converted to Islam en masse. Before the Islamic era, these tribes had looked to the Quraish as their leaders and they would not accept it if anyone imposed some other leadership on them. We have discussed this issue in depth in our article: “Saqifah: A Sunni View”.
Shaikh Al-Sunnah and Lisaan al-Ummah (i.e. Imam al-Baqillani) stated that the there is no requirement that a person must be Quraishi in order to be Caliph. He stated that a person must simply belong to the majority group. This is also stated by Imam Abu Hanifa and Imam Muhammad Riya-Ad-Deen, namely that the leader must simply belong to the group in the majority. Because the Quraishis were the majority group at the time of the Prophet’s death, therefore the Prophet (صلّى الله عليه وآله وسلّم) said the Caliph must be Quraishi. Again, this was based on the principle of majority rule, not upon Assabiyyah (bigotry/tribalism).
Imams al-Ballqani and Abu Hanifa may well have opined the Caliphate is open to all, the pre requisite openly being one’s membership of a majority group, but they are lone voices on the issue. At no point did Rasulullah (s) ever say in Sunni sources that Caliphate was linked to a majority group, if the Sunni sources are be accepted then it was the ad infinitum entitlement of the Quraish. Moreover one wonders why Balliqani’s viewpoint is given any credence when this is not a viewpoint of the Salafi Sect that Ibn al Hashimi ascribes to, when his own blessed Imam Ibn Tamiyah in ‘Minhajj al Sunnah’ Volume 1 page 271 insisted:
كون الخلافة في قريش فلما كان هذا من شرعه ودينه كانت النصوص بذلك معروفة منقولة مأثورة يذكرها الصحابة بخلاف
“The caliphate should remain specific to the Quraysh because this is a part of the Shariah and Deen of Allah therefore the texts about this is renowned and narrated by the companions without any disagreement”.
Minhajj al Sunnah, Volume 1 page 271
Ibn al Hashimi needs to stop grasping opinions that his school does not hold true, if you are a Salafi then remain one, you cannot just pick and chosse beliefs so that you can debate more effectively with the Shia.
In al Hashimi argues:
In any case, the Shia are the last ones who have the right to criticize anyone of Assabiyyah. The entire argument of the Shia is based upon the idea that the leadership of Islam must remain in one particular lineage (i.e. the Banu Hashim); they reject Abu Bakr (رضّى الله عنه) based on the fact that he was born of the wrong family, an argument based in Assabiyyah. The Shia say that Nahjul Balagha contains the letters and sermons of Ali (رضّى الله عنه) ; of course, the Sunnis know that many of these letters and sermons are fabrications. Nonetheless, let us read what the Shia consider to be authentic. We read:
“Your ancestor, Ummayya was not equal to our ancestor, the famous Hashim, neither Harb, another ancestor of yours, was equal to our Abdul Muttalib…What is more, no freed-slave can be considered equal to a Muhajir and one coming from a doubtful lineage cannot claim to be equal to those who come from the noble parentage…”
(Nahjul Balagha, Letter 17, http://www.al-islam.org/nahjul/index.htm)
What could be more biggotted than this Shia saying, namely that a freed-slave cannot be considered equal to a Muhajir or that one coming from a doubtful lineage cannot claim to be equal to those who come from a noble one? Is this not the essence of Assabiyyah? Compare this to the Sunnis who have a saying that even an Abyssinian slave can be the Caliph; the Prophet (صلّى الله عليه وآله وسلّم) said in a Sunni Hadith:
“I admonish you to fear Allah, to listen and obey (your leader) even if an Abyssinian slave is appointed as your leader.”
(Sunan Abu Dawud and Al-Tirmidhi)
Unfortunately the error here is in the English translation. The context is that Maula Ali (as) is refuting the right of Muawiyah to be Khalifa as he was from the Tulaqa, i.e. those that converted following the conquest of Makka. The same opinion was shared by Umar whose words have been recorded in the following esteemed Sunni works:
Asad’ul Ghaba:
“Umar said that caliphate will remain with the participants of Badr and the Tulqa and their children have no share in it”
Now using Ibn al Hashimi’s line of argument:
What could be more bigoted than this Umar saying, namely that a freed-slave cannot be considered equal to a Muhajir or that one coming from a doubtful lineage cannot claim to be equal to those who come from a noble one?